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The Most Sacred Text: The Supreme Court's
Use of The Federalist Papers
James G. Wilson*
I. INTRODUCTION
In interpreting the Constitution the Supreme Court has in-
creasingly referred to The Federalist papers,1 a series of essays
written by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay2
during the struggle to ratify the Constitution.3 This article de-
* Associate Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, Cleveland State
University. B.A., 1969, Princeton University; J.D., 1974, University of Chicago. The au-
thor wishes to thank Professors Peter Garlock, Joel Finer, and Robin West for their
helpful observations. Additionally, the author gratefully acknowledges the research assis-
tance of Alison Kerester and the support from the Cleveland-Marshall fund.
1. THE FEDERALIST (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). The Federalist brilliantly argued that the
Constitution would strengthen the country without jeopardizing individual liberties or
destroying state sovereignty.
Since the Supreme Court and constitutional historians have used many editions of
The Federalist, I have changed all page citations to be consistent with the Rossiter edi-
tion, which is based on the original 1788 McLean edition.
Since LEXIS only surveys Supreme Court cases back to 1925, this article could
never have been written without the efforts of Professor Pierson, who listed all the cases
citing The Federalist as of 1924. Pierson, The Federalist in the Supreme Court, 33 YALE
L.J. 728 (1924). Pierson made no effort to link those cases with ongoing historiography;,
his survey was totally factual.
2. Because Jay wrote only five of the letters (all straightforward expositions on the
need for a strong central government to respond to international issues), he has never
been as seriously considered by theorists as Hamilton or Madison in studies of The Fed-
eralist. Jay planned to write more letters but was injured during a riot in 1788. G. PEL-
LEW, JOHN JAY 225-28 (1890). This article continues the tradition of focusing on Hamil-
ton and Madison.
3. Increasing references to The Federalist can be seen in the following table:
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scribes in narrative form4 how the Court has incorporated The
Federalist into its opinions, 5 and summarizes how constitutional
historians and political scientists have evaluated The Federalist
and the Constitution. This format highlights the limited nature
The Federalist
Number of Times Cited
Decade Number of Decisions Opinion Concurrence Dissent
1790-1799 1 1 0 0
1800-1809 0 0 0 0
1810-1819 2 1 0 1
1820-1829 7 6 1 1
1830-1839 5 2 1 3
1840-1849 8 6 0 7
1850-1859 9 5 1 5
1860-1869 6 5 0 1
1870-1879 8 5 1 4
1880-1889 6 4 0 2
1890-1899 7 6 0 1
1900-1909 5 4 0 1
1910-1919 3 2 0 1
1920-1929 4 4 0 1
1930-1939 11 7 1 3
1940-1949 16 9 1 6
1950-1959 18 7 2 11
1960-1969 31 14 6 14
1970-1979 35 18 3 21
1980-1984 24 16 5 14
TOTAL: 206 122 22 97
4. The distinction between narrative and analytical form can be one of degree. Some
analytical pattern lurks behind any choice of events, but many historians' primary ana-
lytical goal is to describe past events as well as they can. See, e.g., P. VEYNE, WRITING
HisToRY, EssAY ON EPISTEMOLOGY (M. Moore-Rinvolucri trans. 1984).
5. The following justices cited The Federalist three or more times: Douglas (24),
Frankfurter (11), Black (10), Burger (10), Rehnquist (10), Harlan [the younger] (9), Pow-
ell (9), Brennan (7), Blackmun (5), Campbell (5), Field (5), Fuller (5), Marshall, T. (5),
O'Connor (5), Thompson (5), Clifford (4), McReynolds (4), Stevens (4), Stewart (4),
Story (4), Sutherland (4), Swayne (4), Warren (4), Woodbury (4), Catron (3), Jackson
(3), McLean (3), Marshall, J. (3), Miller (3). Thirty-five justices cited The Federalist
once or twice. Both Brandeis and Holmes cited The Federalist only once.
6. The Federalist has been admired by politicians and theorists since its initial pub-
lication. Jefferson wrote: "[A]ppeal [to The Federalist] is habitually made by all, and
rarely declined or denied by any as evidence of the general opinion of those who framed,
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of the Court's historical inquiry by demonstrating that the Court
and constitutional scholars have been traveling in parallel uni-
verses. Either the Court has ignored or been unaware of the
fruits of these scholars' research, thus limiting its selection of
scholars to those who have admired The Federalist, or the Court
has formulated and presented historical impressions based upon
uncited sources not subject to evaluation.
The Court has followed a traditional approach in analyzing
The Federalist. First, the Court has assumed The Federalist's
relevance and importance.7 Second, the Court has either quoted
from The Federalist, taking statements at face value, or made
brief citations to the document. The Court, when referring to
The Federalist, has apparently presupposed that The Federal-
ist's authors would have agreed with the Court's interpretation
and application. However, justices have frequently disagreed
over the meaning of passages in The Federalist-a debate made
inevitable by its many ambiguities and inconsistencies-and
have usually made little effort to rebut alternative
interpretations.
In other words, the Court has not made a real effort to un-
derstand The Federalist. The Court has not answered a number
of questions common to other extrinsic aids used in constitu-
tional interpretation: Why has The Federalist been considered
so valuable a source? Should The Federalist have played such a
significant role in the Court's constitutional analysis? When two
justices interpret The Federalist differently (or one justice sim-
and of those who accepted the Constitution of the United States, on questions as to its
genuine meaning." T. JEFFERSON, THE COMPLETE JEFFERSON 1112 (S. Padover ed. 1943),
quoted in C. RossrrER, ALEXANDER HAMILTON AND THE CONSTITUTION 52 (1964).
In 1788, Washington wrote to Hamilton:
When the transient circumstances and fugitive performances which attended
this Crisis shall have disappeared, That Work will merit the Notice of Poster-
ity; because in it are candidly and ably discussed the Principles of freedom and
the topics of government, which will be always interesting to mankind so long
as they shall be connected in Civil Society.
30 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON FROM THE ORIGINAL MANuscRIPT SOURCES 66
(Fitzpatrick ed. 1931-1944), quoted in C. RossrrIER, supra.
Alexis de Tocqueville frequently consulted The Federalist when he wrote his famous
study of America. He considered it an "excellent book, which ought to be familiar to the
statesmen of all countries." A. DE TocQUEvILLE, 1 DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 121-22 n.2
(Schocken ed. 1961). Clinton Rossiter found that "The Federalist is the most important
work in political science that has ever been written, or is likely ever to be written, in the
United States." THE FEDERALIST, supra note 1, at vii.
7. The nineteenth-century Court praised The Federalist and its authors, and the
twentieth-century Court summarily presumed the papers' interpretive value.
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ply ignores it), whose version is more historically correct? What
impact did the papers have on the ratification process? How
much do we need to know about The Federalist's authors and
the era in which it was written? How relevant should this two-
hundred-year-old document be in our modern times? The histo-
riography of The Federalist and the Constitution helps answer
these questions.
Throughout the nineteenth century, the "Federalist histori-
ans" agreed that the Constitution's ratification was a triumph of
patriotism and reason over parochial passions. This consensus
was obliterated in 1913 by Charles Beard's An Economic Inter-
pretation of the Constitution of the United States.8 Beard at-
tempted to prove, based on Madison's Letter Number 10, that
the Framers were consciously motivated by economic self-inter-
est-they wanted the new government to provide them with eco-
nomic protection. Subsequent constitutional historians, in the
process of either attacking or defending Beard's theory, have
produced a wealth of information about The Federalist, its au-
thors, and the era surrounding its publication. But before one
can appreciate the need for the Court to expand its historical
inquiry by taking advantage of this wealth of information, one
must understand the importance of history in constitutional
adjudication.
II. USE OF HISTORY IN CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION
Two issues determine the importance of history in constitu-
tional adjudication: First, whether history is relevant to consti-
tutional adjudication, and second, if history is relevant, how his-
tory should be used in constitutional adjudication.
A. Relevance of History in Constitutional Adjudication
The Supreme Court has determined that history is relevant
in constitutional adjudication by making consistent references to
historical events, documents, and studies. Yet some scholars be-
lieve that justices should confine their constitutional analysis to
the plain meaning of the words and interpret those words to ad-
vance desirable contemporary values. One such scholar is Profes-
sor Paul Brest, who called the historical enterprise to determine
8. C. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES (1913).
[1985
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original intentions a "misconceived quest," echoing Henry
Ford's quip, "History is Bunk."" Brest concluded that "one can
better protect fundamental values and the integrity of demo-
cratic processes by protecting them than by guessing how other
people meant to govern a different society a hundred or more
years ago."10 Brest supported his conclusion by demonstrating
the difficulties in determining whose intentions matter, what
those intentions were, and the relevance of those intentions to
novel or evolving problems. Brest also stated that to use history
in constitutional analysis one must overcome the subjectivity
that distorts any historical work and makes objective knowledge
of the past impossible.1"
Other scholars have disagreed with Brest. Professor Raoul
Berger argued that total rejection of history would allow courts
and legislatures to ignore all decisions and laws by claiming that
they have no ability or obligation to understand, much less fol-
low, their predecessors' views.12 Philosopher John Miller wrote
that law is by definition historical:
A rule without antecedents or liability to revision lacks, in
the end, any relevance or meaning, since it could never be elu-
cidated in words, which are themselves the vehicles of accumu-
lated experience. Such a rule, purporting to be independent of
history, operates only as a natural force and can be met only
by force. 13
Miller asserted that history is an inescapable part of identity:
"One needs a past. A historical past is more than a thing of
9. Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L. REV.
204 (1980).
10. Id. at 238.
11. Id. at 221-22. Such relativism flirts with Samuel Beckett's nihilism:
Was I sleeping, while the others suffered? Am I sleeping now? Tomorrow,
when I wake, or think I do, what shall I say of today? That with Estragon my
friend, at this place, until the fall of night, I waited for Godot? That Pozzo
passed, with his carrier, and that he spoke to us? Probably. But in all that
what truth will be there?
S. BECKET, WAITING FOR GODOT 58 (S. Beckett trans. 1970); see also M. MANDELBAUM,
THE ANATOMY OF HIsToicAL KNOWLEDGE 148 (1977):
[Croce's] insistence that all history is contemporary history rested on his view
that artifacts and documents, considered as objective facts, are without signifi-
cance until the historian who examines them brings them to life through his
imaginative re-creation of them. Thus, for him, none of the data with which
historians deal are ultimately independent of the subjects by whom they are
known.
12. Berger, Paul Brest's Brief for an Imperial Judiciary, 40 MD. L. REv. 1 (1981).
13. J. MILLER, THE PHILOSOPHY OF HIsToRY 180 (1981).
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time; it is always the bearer of infinity, the dynamic of divine
forces in time."' 4
Thus, there is both support for the position that history is
relevant in constitutional adjudication and for the position that
it is not. In this article I assume, as the Supreme Court has, that
history is relevant.
B. Influence of History on Constitutional Adjudication
Even if one assumes that history is relevant in constitu-
tional adjudication, one must still determine how much influ-
ence history should have on such adjudication. This problem can
be partially resolved by determining how to use history: as rhet-
oric, evidence of motive or intent, an illustration of consistency,
or an inquiry into the evolution of values.
Raoul Berger contended that whenever the specific beliefs
of the Framers could be ascertained the Court is bound by those
beliefs. Accordingly, Berger claimed that the Court erred when it
held that the historical background of the fourteenth amend-
ment supported desegregation of public schools and reappor-
tionment of state legislatures. The Court should have deferred
to the Framers' documented opposition to such specific
interpretations. 15
14. Id. at 167; see also J. ORTEGA Y GAsSET, HISTORY AS A SYSTEM AND OTHER ESSAYS
TOWARD A PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY 192 (1941), in which philosopher Jose Ortega y Gasset
traced antihistorical theorizing to the Greek philosopher Parmenides, who was "search-
ing for a fixed, static consistency, hence something that the entity already is, which al-
ready composes or constitutes it." The Greeks' acceptance of Parmenides' views meant
that the term "history" became an opponent of the term "reason." Id. at 231. Ortega y
Gasset attempted to resolve this conflict by engaging in "historical reason," which "ac-
cepts nothing as mere fact: it makes every fact fluid in the fieri whence it comes, it sees
how the fact takes place." Id. at 232. Ortega y Gasset concluded that facts emerge from
"ideas-interpretations-that man has manufactured at a given juncture of his life." Id.
at 233.
As intriguing as this ancient debate is, this article, like most other historical pieces,
will not directly probe the issue of history's applicability and feasibility. I will assume, as
I believe, that despite its limitations and ambiguities history should be a part of any
legal inquiry. I agree with Ralph Waldo Emerson that "there is properly no History; only
Biography." II THE COLLECTED WORKS OF RALPH WALDO EMERSON 6 (J. Slater ed. 1979).
Emerson meant that one should try actively to read history as if one were reliving the
events. Applying his theory to constitutional history, one compares one's own reactions
to a case with the views of those who first faced the underlying forces that generated the
law. This attempt to understand one's historical past, making history a form of political
psychoanalysis, does not necessitate deifying the Framers; it only requires sufficient im-
mersion in what we know of their lives so we can remain organically connected with our
past and have the benefits of their wisdom and shortcomings.
15. See R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 89, 214, 293, 407-18 (1977).
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On the other hand, the Framers may not have intended to
bind future generations to their original conceptions. As Hamil-
ton stated in The Federalist,
Nothing, therefore, can be more fallacious than to infer the ex-
tent of any power proper to be lodged in the national govern-
ment from an estimate of its immediate necessities. There
ought to be a CAPACITY to provide for future contingencies
as they may happen; and as these are illimitable in their na-
ture, so it is impossible safely to limit that capacity.16
Berger might reply as he did in Government by Judiciary, that
"Hamilton rejected the argument that the courts were empow-
ered 'to construe the laws according to the spirit of the
Constitution.' "17
Despite his strong commitment to history, John Miller
would probably oppose, as a "static rule," Berger's total defer-
ence to known contemporaneous intentions. Miller stated:
"Those who propose such rules do not want anyone to act. Ac-
tion is to be under the law rather than the source of law in its
self-maintenance." s
The problem, then, is how the Supreme Court should bal-
ance competing forces of continuity, deference, necessity, and
novelty. Just as history attempts to describe the acts of unique
individuals in a specific era, legal cases present unique problems
and unique situations. Justice Holmes summarized the process:
16. THE FEDERLIST, supra note 1, No. 34 at 207 (A. Hamilton). Hamilton consist-
ently advanced a broad interpretation of constitutional powers throughout his career:
"[No construction ought to prevail calculated to defeat the express and necessary au-
thority of the government." 8 THE WoRxs OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 380 (H.C. Lodge ed.
1904).
17. R. BERGER, supra note 15, at 294 (quoting THE FEDERALIST, supra note 1, No. 81
at 482 (A. Hamilton)). Hamilton did not think that the Supreme Court would construe
its power so broadly. Rather, he thought that the Supreme Court's discretion would be
no greater than the discretion of a state court to construe that state's constitution. Fur-
thermore, judges tend to be more fit to decide cases than legislative members who always
retain the ultimate sanction of impeachment for unwarranted judicial opinions. THE
FEDERALIST, supra note 1, No. 81 at 482-85 (A. Hamilton).
18. J. MILLER, supra note 13, at 176. Ronald Dworkin attempted to resolve this
problem by distinguishing the Framers' broad concept of basic values protected by the
Constitution from their specific conceptions of how the Constitution would work. Dwor-
kin concluded that one should primarily be concerned with the Framers' concept of gov-
ernment. However, there are problems with Dworkin's imagery. For example, one may
agree with Hamilton's broad conception of the Commerce Clause-justifying a national
bank-without accepting Hamilton's underlying commitment to the concept of constitu-
tional monarchy. For an example of Dworkin's thesis, see Dworkin, The Forum of Princi-
pie, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 469 (1981).
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"[E]very question of construction is unique, and an argument
that would prevail in one case may be inadequate in another."1
Nevertheless, the historical inquiry is a useful starting point in
developing perspective; an unwillingness to revert completely to
eighteenth century legal values does not preclude efforts to un-
derstand the brilliant thoughts and deeds of that era. Perhaps
history should be presumptively controlling, or should tip the
scales in a close case.
If history is given some weight in constitutional adjudica-
tion, one must then determine what the Court is trying to verify
and by what method it can achieve that verification through his-
torical analysis. Jacobus tenBroek wrote that the Court claimed
to be engaging in historical research to determine the intentions
of the people who supported and voted for the Constitution, a
task tenBroek found "manifestly indeterminable. ' 20 TenBroek
observed that the Court's methodology, which was unequal to its
articulated task, consisted primarily of relying upon convention
debates and proceedings to determine the Framers' remedy for a
given problem. Whenever the Court found that history
presented views contrary to its planned holding, the Court re-
jected, ignored, or distorted that history. Consequently, the
Court's historical analysis was "an instrument of persuasion. '21
TenBroek was not troubled by the Court's analysis since he be-
lieved the Constitution was "designed to reach beyond the scope
of merely preserving order."2 2 The Framers did not intend a
"static society"; they would agree that "our contemplation can-
not be only of what has been but of what may be."
'23
19. United States v. Jin Fuey Moy, 241 U.S. 394, 402 (1916).
20. tenBroek, Admissibility and Use by the United States Supreme Court of Ex-
trinsic Aids in Constitutional Construction, 26 CAnrp. L. REV. 287, 437, 453, 664 (1938).
For another example of the impact of extrinsic aids on case law, see Nolan, Sir William
Blackstone and the New American Republic: A Study of Intellectual Impact, 51 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 731 (1976). One of the finest examples of a study of the Court's use of history in
specific cases is C. MILLER, THE SuPREE COURT AND THE USES OF HIsToRY (1969); see
also Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 Sup. CT. REv. 119; Powell,
The Compleat Jeffersonian: Justice Rehnquist and Federalism, 91 YALE L.J. 1317
(1982). For examples of "left" interpretations of legal history, see Feinman, The Role of
Ideas in Legal History, 78 MIcH. L. REv. 722 (1980); Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36
STAN. L. REv. 57 (1984); Gordon, Historicism in Legal Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1017
(1981); Horwitz, The Conservative Tradition in the Writing of American Legal History,
17 AM. J. OF LEGAL HIST. 275 (1973).
21. tenBroek, supra note 20, at 308.
22. Id. at 680.
23. Id. at 680-81.
[1985
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Undoubtedly, the Court has used The Federalist as an in-
strument of persuasion. Nevertheless, according to tenBroek, the
authors of the papers might not have objected. Indeed, both
Madison and Hamilton supported broad, flexible constructions
of the new Constitution.
III. THE SUPREME COURT'S USE OF The Federalist
The following cases have been divided into two groups:
those decided before and after the publication of Charles
Beard's controversial book. Although Beard radically altered the
historiography of both The Federalist and the Constitution, the
Court has not taken advantage of the wealth of information re-
sulting from support of and rebuttals to Beard's theory. Rather,
the Court has continued to use the same methodology employed
prior to Beard's thesis.
A. Pre-Charles Beard (1789-1913)
The Federalist gained prestige almost from its publication.
The Supreme Court continually used it as an instrument of per-
suasion-citing it as an authoritative source in support of a de-
sired holding, and ignoring it or giving it little weight if it op-
posed the Court's desired holding.
1. Early Historiography of The Federalist and the
Constitution
The Federalist gained immediate prestige because of the
early Court's frequent use of the document and lavish praise of
its authors. The Federalist's publication as a book in 1788, the
same year as its initial newspaper publication, also aided its
prestige.24 Other publications relating to the ratification of the
Constitution were not published until much later. Almost forty
years passed before Elliot's (or Elliott's) Debates were pub-
lished.2 5 Madison's papers were not published until 1840,26 and
24. Only one New York newspaper, the Independent Journal, published The Feder-
alist in its entirety. McLean issued the first bound edition in 1788. For more details, see
B. MITCHELL, ALEXANDER HAMILTON, YOUTH TO MATURITY 632 n.13 (1957).
25. THE DEBATES IN THE STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CON-
STITUTION (J. Elliott ed. 1836-45). This work was a collection of debates in the state
ratifying conventions. The early Supreme Court frequently resorted to this source. See,
e.g., Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 54 (1849); The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7
How.) 283, 543 (1849); Woodruff v. Parham, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 123, 135 (1869); The Legal
Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 621 (1871) (Clifford, J., dissenting); Hans v. Louisi-
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Hamilton's Works were printed in 1851.27 Farrand's Records did
not appear until 1911.28
Many histories of the Constitution were published before
Beard's work. The Court has referred to Story,29 Kent,30 Cur-
tis,s1 Rawle,32 and Cooley" in cases in which it also consulted
ana, 134 U.S. 1, 14 (1890).
C. Lee, counsel in Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299, 304 (1803), cited Madison's
Speeches at the Virginia Convention. The Virginia Debates were also consulted in Flor-
ida v. Georgia, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 478, 518-19 (1855). Madison's 1799 Report to the Vir-
ginia Legislature was used, along with The Federalist, to determine the meaning of "mi-
gration and importation" in McKinley's concurring opinion in The Passenger Cases, 48
U.S. at 453.
26. THE PAPERS OF JAMS MADISON (1840). Madison's delay in publishing his papers,
particularly his notes on the Constitutional Convention, partially resulted from his
changed political views. Robert Yates, who attended the Convention as a delegate from
New York but later supported the Anti-Federalists in the ratification struggle, published
his notes in 1827, showing Madison's early nationalism:
Urged in 1827 to publish [the Notes] to refute Yates, he replied that only three
of the framers were still living and it would be more delicate and more useful
to wait until all were gone. No personal or party views could then be imputed.
He did not explain (as he did to Jefferson in 1799) that publication would aid
the opposing party.
I. BRANT, JAMES MADISON, FATHER OF THE CONSTITUTION 22 (1950).
Madison's papers were frequently consulted to explore the meaning of the Constitu-
tion, but not the meaning of The Federalist. See Nelson v. Carland, 42 U.S. (1 How.)
265, 272 (1843); The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 396, 543 (1849) (both sides);
Woodruff v. Parham, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 123, 135 (1869). Madison's Notes on the Conven-
tion were used in Jackson v. Steamboat Magnolia, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 296, 332 (1858)
(Campbell, J., dissenting). His writings were also cited in Springer v. United States, 102
U.S. 586, 596 (1881).
27. THE WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON (J.C. Hamilton ed. 1850-51). Hamilton's
Works were cited in Scholey v. Rew, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 331, 348 (1875); Springer v.
United States, 102 U.S. 586, 597 (1881); and Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co., 157
U.S. 429, 572 (1895).
28. THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 (M. Farrand ed. 1911).
29. J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (1833).
Story was cited in The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 556 (1849); Gordon v.
United States, 117 U.S. 697, 700 (1864); Ex Parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 388
(1867); The Justices v. Murray, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 274, 277-78 (1870); The Legal Tender
Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 665 (1871) (Field, J., dissenting); and Wisconsin v. Pelican
Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 265, 289 (1888).
30. J. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW (1826). Kent was considered in The
Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 555 (1849); Gordon v. United States, 117 U.S.
697, 700 (1864); and Plaquemines Tropical Fruit Co. v. Henderson, 170 U.S. 511, 517-18
(1898).
31. G. CURTIS, HISTORY OF THE ORIGIN, FORMATION, AND ADOPTION OF THE CONSTITU-
TION OF THE UNITED STATES (1854-58) was included in a string citation with The Federal-
ist in Edwards v. Kearzey, 96 U.S. 595, 606 (1878).
32. W. RAWLE, A ViEw OF THE CONSTrrUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (1829) was re-
ferred to in Pacific Ins. Co. v. Soule, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 433, 445 (1869) and McPherson v.
Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 36 (1892).
33. T. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON
[1985
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The Federalist. Additionally, some justices have turned to the
First Session of Congress 34 and the 1789 Judiciary Act 35 for
guidance in determining the original intentions of the Framers
of the Constitution. Even though these other reference materials
were available, the Court and the historians developed a consen-
sus that The Federalist papers were the major source to deter-
mine the wisdom, virtue, and meaning of the Constitution.
2. The Court's canonization of The Federalist through rhetoric
and frequent diverse application
From the beginning the Court, when interpreting the Con-
stitution, frequently cited The Federalist and praised its au-
thors. For example, Chief Justice Chase turned to The Federal-
ist in Calder v. Bull36 when he voided, under the Constitution's
ex post facto prohibition, a state statute repealing a prior pro-
bate court decision. Chief Justice Chase believed the "author" of
The Federalist to be superior to both Sir William Blackstone
and Mr. Woodeson "for his extensive and accurate knowledge of
the true principles of Government.
37
THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION (1868) appeared in Scho-
ley v. Rew, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 331, 348 (1875).
34. The First Session of Congress, dominated by the Framers of the Constitution,
has always been another major source of information on original intentions. See The
Justices v. Murray, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 274, 282 (1870); Plaquemines Tropical Fruit Co. v.
Henderson, 170 U.S. 511, 516 (1898). Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 616-17
(1842), referred to both the 1791 and 1793 congressional sessions.
35. See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 420 (1821); Claflin v: Houseman,
93 U.S. 130, 139 (1876); Plaquemines Tropical Fruit Co. v. Henderson, 170 U.S. 511, 516-
18 (1898).
36. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798).
37. Id. at 391. Chase did not use the The Federalist, as he could have, to justify the
Court's judicial review of the unconstitutional state law.
The Court later used The Federalist to defend an over-expanding scope of judicial
review. After quoting Number 22 on the need for supreme judicial authority to insure
uniformity, Justice Wayne in Dodge v. Woolsey, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 331, 358 (1856), said:
"Hitherto we have shown from the constitution itself that the framers of it meant to
provide a jurisdiction for its final interpretation, and for the laws passed by Congress, to
give them an equal operation in all of the States." Justice Wayne actually demonstrated
that the Court needed The Federalist to find the broad scope of judicial review which
did not overtly exist in the Constitution. Even Justice Campbell, who dissented in
Dodge, later relied on Hamilton to justify broad judicial jurisdiction, particularly in ad-
miralty cases:
The judicial power of the United States was organized to comprehend all
cases that might properly arise under the Constitution, laws, and treaties of
the United States, and, in addition, cases of which, from the character of the
parties, the decision might involve the peace and harmony of the Union. This
principle was accepted without dissent among the framers of the Constitution.
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The Marshall Court also praised The Federalist. For exam-
ple, in his concurring and dissenting opinion in Fletcher v.
Peck38 Justice Johnson stated that the "letters of Publius, which
are well known to be entitled to the highest respect," 39 rein-
forced the principle that the states are to be "restrained, either
by general principles which are common to our free institutions,
or by the particular provisions of the constitution of the United
States."40 In 1819 Chief Justice Marshall interpreted The Feder-
alist in McCulloch v. Maryland41 to rebut the State of Mary-
land's argument that Hamilton's Number 34 allowed state taxa-
tion of the national bank (support of equal taxing powers for
state and federal governments). After deifying the authors--"No
tribute can be paid to them which exceeds their merit""2-Chief
Justice Marshall claimed Maryland quoted The Federalist out
of context. According to Chief Justice Marshall, Number 34 only
addressed the Anti-Federalist concern that federal taxing power
could swallow the states and did not affirm the power of the
states to tax the federal government. Marshall claimed that the
authors would have agreed with him if they had been asked
about the specific issue.43 Having become a states' rights advo-
cate by the time of McCulloch, James Madison must have been
distraught by Chief Justice Marshall's paraphrasing of the argu-
ment in Number 44 that every constitutional power has the im-
plied means to fulfill that power."
The Court has used The Federalist to support the legal use
of ambiguous terms such as "piracy" 45 and to illuminate struc-
tural issues such as the scope of concurrent state and federal
Jackson v. Steamboat Magnolia, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 296, 332 (1858) (Campbell, J.,
dissenting).
38. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810) (Johnson, J., concurring and dissenting).
39. Id. at 144 (Johnson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
40. Fletcher, 10 U.S. at 139.
41. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
42. Id. at 433.
43. Id. at 435.
44. Madison wrote: "No axiom is more clearly established in law, or in reason, than
that wherever the end is required, the means are authorized; wherever a general power to
do a thing is given, every particular power necessary for doing it is included." THE FED-
ERALIST, supra note 1, No. 43 at 285 (J. Madison). Marshall restated the idea in McCul-
loch: "Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all
means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not pro-
hibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional." 17
U.S. at 421.
45. United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 158-59 (1820).
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court jurisdiction.46 When the Court found broad appellate juris-
diction over national and state systems in Cohens v. Virginia,4"
it turned to The Federalist: "Great weight has always been at-
tached, and very rightly attached to contemporaneous exposi-
tion. . . . The opinion of The Federalist has always been con-
sidered as of great authority.
48
Justice Story claimed that The Federalist supported broad
presidential discretion in calling out the militia;49 but he did not
turn to Madison's Number 44, to support his rule of constitu-
tional construction that "these powers must be so construed as
to the modes of their exercise as not to defeat the great end in
view." 50 Justice Trimble found an underlying political philoso-
phy in The Federalist which affects all constitutional
interpretation:
In my judgment, the language of the authors of the Federalist
proves that they, at least, understood, that the protection of
personal security, and of private rights, from the despotic and
iniquitous operation of retrospective legislation, was, itself, and
alone, the grand principle intended to be established.5'
In Cherokee Nation v. Georgia 2 Justice Baldwin expressed
reservation about The Federalist's relevance in constitutional
adjudication. The majority had made no reference to The Feder-
alist when defining the term "state" for purposes of original Su-
preme Court jurisdiction; however, Justice Baldwin's concurring
opinion raised doubts about the Court's construction of the
Constitution:
We can thus expound the constitution without a reference
to the definitions of a state or nation by any foreign writer,
hypothetical reasoning, or the dissertations of the Federalist.
This would be to substitute individual authority in place of the
declared will of the sovereign power of the union, in a written
fundamental law ... It would be dangerous in the extreme to
infer from extrinsic circumstances, that a case for which the
46. Houston v. Moore, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1, 8-9 (1820); see also Kendall v. United
States, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 571 (1838).
47. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
48. Id. at 418-19.
49. Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19, 30 (1827).
50. Id. at 30.
51. Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 331 (1827).
52. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
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words of an instrument expressly provide, shall be exempted
from its operation. 3
Apparently, Justice Baldwin was questioning whether The Fed-
eralist, or any other historical work, was relevant in constitu-
tional adjudication. Even so, the Court continued to consult The
Federalist.
The scope of the states' taxing powers generated the first
disagreement among the justices concerning The Federalist's
meaning. Justice Thompson, who was not sitting on the bench
when McCulloch was decided, claimed in Brown v. Maryland5
4
that Number 32 supported his decision that states could tax im-
ports after such imports became articles of internal trade. When
Justice Thompson again used Number 32 in Weston v. City
Council of Charleston,55 Chief Justice Marshall countered that
the "great statesmen" would have agreed with him that the
states could not tax stock issued by the United States for its
own loans.56
The heated historical debate over the constitutionality of
state taxation continued in The Passenger Cases,57 where two
justices disagreed over The Federalist's position on state taxa-
tion of alien passengers. Although both justices agreed on the
case's merits, Justice McLean claimed to defer more to The Fed-
eralist's authority than to the weight of its arguments, 8 while
Justice McKinley concluded:
The acknowledged accuracy of language and clearness of dic-
tion in the Constitution would seem to forbid the imputation
of so gross an error to the distinguished authors of that instru-
ment .... Were they, however, directly opposed to it, they
could not, by any known rule of construction, control or modify
the plain and unambiguous language of the clause in
question.5 9
The early Court also invoked The Federalist in a number of
other situations. For example, in City of New York v. Miln Jus-
tice Barbour used The Federalist to help define the Commerce
53. Id. at 40-41 (Baldwin, J., concurring).
54. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419, 456 (1827) (Thompson, J., dissenting).
55. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 449, 477 (1829) (Thompson, J., dissenting).
56. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 469.
57. 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849).
58. Id. at 396.
59. Id. at 453.
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Clause.60 Justice Barbour held that the states under their police
power could require ships to register and fine ships that failed to
register. Since he was broadening state power, Barbour dis-
cussed Number 45:
Let us see what powers are left with the states. The Federalist,
in the 45th number, speaking of this subject, says; the powers
reserved to the several states, will extend to all the objects,
which in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, liber-
ties, and properties of the people; and the internal order, im-
provement, and prosperity of the state. 1
In The License Cases62 Justice Catron relied on the history
of The Federalist in upholding state power to license liquor re-
tailers. He said that Number 32 particularly supported his
interpretation
in favor of the State power. These remarks were made to quiet
the fears of the people, and to clear up doubts on the meaning
of the constitution, then before them for adoption by the State
conventions. And it is an historical truth, never, so far as I
know, denied, that these papers were received by the people of
the States as the true exponents of the instrument submitted
for their ratification.
6 3
Madison's Number 43 was invoked in Prigg v. Pennsylva-
nia6 4 when Justice Story held that the national government
must enforce the fugitive slave laws "to carry into effect all the
rights and duties imposed upon it by the Constitution. '65 Chief
Justice Taney also employed The Federalist in Dred Scott v.
Sandford,6 but only to show the historical need for national reg-
ulation of the territories.
The Court also used The Federalist to limit states' powers.
In Fox v. Ohio67 the Court described one of The Federalist's am-
biguous rules of constitutional construction:
Mr. Hamilton, in the thirty-second number of The Feder-
alist, says there is an exclusive delegation of power by the
States to the federal government in three cases:-1. Where in
60. 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102 (1837).
61. Id. at 133.
62. 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504 (1847).
63. Id. at 607.
64. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842).
65. Id. at 616.
66. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 447 (1857).
67. 46 U.S. (5 How.) 410 (1847).
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express terms an exclusive authority is granted; 2. Where the
power granted is inhibited to the States; and 3. Where the ex-
ercise of an authority granted to the Union by a State would be
"contradictory and repugnant. ' 68 ,
The Court then summarily concluded that congressional power
to punish counterfeiters fell under the third category and thus a
state could not punish the same act that a congressional act
punished. Neither conclusion necessarily followed from Hamil-
ton's formula, and the Court could have found even broader
standards of national delegation in Hamilton's other works. Yet
the Court did not explain why Number 45, which had been used
in Miln to broaden states' power, did not apply.
In Luther v. Borden 9 Justice Woodbury used Hamilton's
Number 77 to brilliantly analyze the relationship of the judici-
ary to the other two federal branches and the relationship of all
three branches to the people. He first warned that a distant
court may oppress the people, but said that the Court has less
power because it only reacts to laws and actions initiated by the
other two branches. Justice Woodbury stated that all three
branches are ultimately dependent upon the people's will.
[I]f the judiciary at times seems to fill the important station of
a check in the government, it is rather a check on the legisla-
ture, who may attempt to pass laws contrary to the Constitu-
tion, or on the executive, who may violate both the laws and
Constitution, than on the people themselves in their primary
capacity as makers and amenders of the constitutions.7
0
The Federalist was also used to support a decision ex-
tending diversity jurisdiction to corporations in Marshall v. Bal-
timore & Ohio Railroad Co.71 Justice Campbell raised the classic
objection to the majority's use of The Federalist -extrapolation
from such dated evidence. Campbell concluded that The Feder-
alist, by its own language, was useless in determining a corpora-
tion's right to diversity jurisdiction: "Nor were corporations
within the contemplation of the framers of the Constitution
when they delegated a jurisdiction over controversies between
the citizens of different States.
' 2
68. Id. at 439.
69. 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
70. Id. at 53 (Woodbury, J., dissenting).
71. 57 U.S. (16 How.) 314, 326 (1853).
72. Id. at 351 (Campbell, J., dissenting).
[1985
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Ex Parte Garland7 3 provided an ironic variation of The
Federalist's uncertain influence in constitutional adjudication.
The majority voided congressional legislation requiring all attor-
neys-including those pardoned after the Civil War-to swear
under oath that they had never taken up arms against the
United States. However, the majority did not quote The Feder-
alist, as they could have, to support the holding that the legisla-
tion was a bill of attainder or to reinforce their argument that
congressional interference with the admission of officers of the
Court violated the separation of powers doctrine. The dissent re-
lied on The Federalist to support those two concepts, but never-
theless claimed that the oath was legal. 4
Justices have also used The Federalist to justify significant
reductions in police power in favor of the right to contract. Jus-
tice Strong in his dissent in the Sinking-Fund Cases7 5 inter-
preted Hamilton's Number 84 as verification of limitations on
government beyond the express limitations in the Constitution. 6
Finally, Chief Justice Fuller considered The Federalist
helpful in outlawing income taxes in Pollock v. Farmers' Loan &
Trust Co.:" "In our judgment, the construction given to the
Constitution by the authors of the Federalist. . .should not be
and cannot be disregarded ....
Thus, one sees that the early Court used The Federalist as
a means of persuasion for many different issues. Indeed The
Federalist may be used to support many positions. The justices
traditionally have strengthened their interpretation of the Con-
stitution by invoking the authority of The Federalist.
3. The Court's disregard of The Federalist
When the Court took a position not supported by The Fed-
eralist, it faced a different situation. The response has been ei-
ther to disregard The Federalist or to give it little weight.
The Court has consistently ignored The Federalist's hostil-
ity to paper money. In Briscoe v. Bank of Kentucky, 9 which
upheld the power of a state bank to issue notes, Justice Story
73. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1866).
74. Id. at 388 (Miller, J., dissenting).
75. 99 U.S. 700 (1878).
76. Id. at 736-37 (Strong, J., dissenting).
77. 158 U.S. 601 (1895).
78. Id. at 627.
79. 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 257 (1837).
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dissented on the ground that the constitutional prohibition
against bills of credit was designed to prevent the mischief of
paper money: "This passage shows the clear sense of the writer,
that the prohibition was aimed at a paper medium, which was
intended to circulate as currency; and to that alone."80 In four
more cases a dissenting justice or an attorney argued that the
Court was defying The Federalist's opposition to paper cur-
rency; however, the majorities simply ignored any citation to
The Federalist.,1
The Supreme Court eventually concluded that The Federal-
ist justified increased federal regulation of state elections despite
its explicit language to the contrary. The Court first allowed fed-
eral criminal prosecution for tampering with state election bal-
lots in Ex Parte Clarke.2 In its opinion the majority ignored
Chief Justice Field's dissenting quotation of one of Hamilton's
letters:
Suppose an article had been introduced into the Constitution
empowering the United States to regulate the elections for the
particular States, would any man have hesitated to condemn it,
both as an unwarrantable transposition of power, and as a pre-
meditated engine for the destruction of the State
governments?"
Justice Field's arguments later prevailed in Newberry v. United
States,84 in which the Court held that Congress could not regu-
late the amount of money a state candidate could spend in his
nomination or election. However, later decisions followed Justice
Pitney's concurrence in Newberry, which argued that Hamilton
was only rebutting the Anti-Federalist fear that Congress might
impose discriminatory standards on state elections. According to
Justice Pitney, Congress must have power to regulate elections
since "every government ought to contain in itself the means of
its own preservation. 8 5 In five additional cases the Court ex-
80. Id. at 333. Story also wrote that "[n]ot a single historian" disagreed with his
interpretation of "bills of credit" and of the Framers' opposition to their use. Id.
81. The Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 608 (1871); Legal Tender Case,
110 U.S. 421, 470 (1884); Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330, 334 (1935); Norman v.
Baltimore & O.R.R., 294 U.S. 240, 247 (1935).
82. 100 U.S. 399 (1880).
83. Id. at 418 (Field, C.J., dissenting).
84. 256 U.S. 232 (1921).
85. Id. at 283 (Pitney, J., concurring) (emphasis omitted).
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panded federal power, 6 and disregarded citations to The Feder-
alist that seemed to dictate an opposite result.
B. Post-Charles Beard (1913-Present)
Unlike the early Court, the modern Court has seldom
overtly praised The Federalist and its authors; however, the
modern Court has presumed the papers' interpretive value. One
sees continued respect for The Federalist in the Court's steadily
increasing number of citations to that document. In fact, in dis-
cussing the evolution of constitutional principles and doctrines,
the modern Court has frequently consulted The Federalist as its
first source. Since the Court's conception of the Constitution
went through a virtual revolution in the 1930's and a mild ther-
midor in the 1970's, it is not surprising that The Federalist was
actively invoked by all sides during those transitional periods.
1. State and federal relations
The Federalist has provided several potentially conflicting
answers to the question of the proper relationship between the
states and the federal government. In Farmers Loan & Trust
Co. v. Minnesota87 Justice McReynolds used The Federalist to
void a state testamentary transfer tax on bonds no longer held
in the state. According to Justice McReynolds, the Constitution
was designed to prevent state activities that would "disturb good
relations among the States and produce the kind of discontent
expected to subside after establishment of the Union."88 Yet
when the Court upheld the congressional power establishing un-
employment insurance taxation, McReynolds dissented, quoting
Madison's argument that the only federal powers are those spe-
cifically defined; all other powers remain with the states.8 '
Justice Black used Number 22 to justify Congress's regula-
tion of an insurance company that conducted a substantial
amount of business across state lines. Quoting The Federalist he
stated: "Speaking of the need of a federal power to regulate
'commerce,' Hamilton had earlier said, 'It is, indeed, evident, on
86. MacDougall v. Green, 335 U.S. 281 (1948); Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214 (1952);
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964); Oregon v.
Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
87. 280 U.S. 204 (1930).
88. Id. at 209.
89. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 606 (1937) (McReynolds, J.,
dissenting).
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the most superficial view, that there is no object, either as it re-
spects the interests of trade or finance, that more strongly de-
mands a federal superintendence.' "90 Justice Black, in the same
case, also quoted Madison's acknowledgment in The Federalist
of the "unavoidable inaccuracy" of the Constitution's language
and of the need for time to fully define the law.91
Justice Frankfurter believed The Federalist supported his
experimental federalism, as seen in his dissent from an applica-
tion of the preemption doctrine:
Since this concurrent jurisdiction was "clearly admitted by the
whole tenor" of the Constitution in Hamilton's view, "[i]t is
not ... a mere possibility of inconvenience in the exercise of
powers, but an immediate constitutional repugnancy that can
by implication alienate and extinguish a preexisting right of
sovereignty." 92
Putting great weight on Hamilton's views of the preemption
doctrine, Justice Frankfurter argued that the state power had
not been preempted. But when he dissented in Baker v. Carr,9 3 a
case concerning legislative apportionment, Justice Frankfurter
gave The Federalist little weight. Although he conceded that
The Federalist opposed the "most salient aspects of numerical
inequality," Frankfurter replied that since the colonies had long
accepted partially unequal representation, the existing state ap-
portionment systems were constitutional.9 "
Justice Rehnquist has relied on The Federalist to argue
that the power of the federal government should be limited. In
90. United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 539 n.9 (1944)
(quoting THE FEDERALIST, supra note 1, No. 22 at 143-44 (A. Hamilton)).
91. 322 U.S. at 550 n.33. Madison's arguments sound quite contemporary:
All new laws, though penned with the greatest technical skill and passed on the
fullest and most mature deliberation, are considered as more or less obscure
and equivocal, until their meaning be liquidated and ascertained by a series of
particular discussions and adjudications. Besides the obscurity arising from the
complexity of objects and the imperfection of human faculties, the medium
through which the conceptions of men are conveyed to each other adds a fresh
embarrassment. The use of words is to express ideas.... But no language is so
copious as to supply words and phrases for every complex idea, or so correct as
not to include many equivocally denoting different ideas.
THE FEDERALIST, supra note 1, No. 37 at 229 (J. Madison).
92. Farmers Educ. & Coop. Union v. WDAY, Inc., 360 U.S. 525, 546 (1959) (Frank-
furter, J., dissenting) (quoting THE FEDERALIST, supra note 1, No. 32 at 200-01 (A.
Hamilton)).
93. 369 U.S. 186, 266 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
94. Id. at 307.
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his attack on a majority decision to strike down existing death
penalty statutes in Furman v. Georgia,9 5 he commenced by re-
ferring to Number 78 and to Marbury v. Madison96 acknowledg-
ing the legitimacy of judicial review. Then, quoting Madison's
Number 51, Justice Rehnquist stated why such review should be
cautious: "In framing a government which is to be administered
by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: You must first
enable the government to controul [sic] the governed: and in the
next place, oblige it to controul [sic] itself. '97 Justice Rehnquist
stated that the judicial branch should be "at least as much" ob-
ligated to control itself as it was to control the other two federal
branches."8
Chief Justice Burger later quoted the same platitude to jus-
tify the narrowing of the federal government's power: "This ex-
presses the balancing indispensable in all governing, and the Bill
of Rights is one of the checks to control overreaching by govern-
ment. But it is a check to be exercised sparingly by federal au-
thority over local expressions of choice going to essentially local
concerns."
99
Justice Brennan interpreted The Federalist differently in
National League of Cities v. Usery.100 Justice Rehnquist, writ-
ing for the majority, prohibited congressional regulation of state
employees' wages as a violation of the tenth amendment. Bren-
nan dissented. Relying on Number 31, Brennan insisted that the
judiciary should be reluctant to interfere with congressional leg-
islation over state employees under the commerce clause: "A
government ought to contain in itself every power requisite to
the full accomplishment of the objects committed to its care
.. . .,,1 Rehnquist neither quoted The Federalist nor overtly
rejected Brennan's interpretation.
95. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
96. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
97. 408 U.S. at 470 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting THE FEDERALIST, supra note
1, No. 51 at 322 (J. Madison)).
98. 408 U.S. at 470 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
99. Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 87-88 (1981) (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting).
100. 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Auth., 105 S. Ct. 1005 (1985)).
101. Id. at 857 n.1 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting THE FEDERALIST, supra note 1,
No. 31 at 194 (A. Hamilton)).
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However, Justice O'Connor in her concurrence/dissent in
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission v. MississippiI0 2 re-
sorted to The Federalist in asserting that Usery properly ana-
lyzed the tenth amendment. She quoted Hamilton in Numbers
15 and 16 for two propositions: (1) "the Constitution marked the
'difference between a league and a government,' because it 'ex-
tend[ed] the authority of the union to the persons of the citi-
zens,-the only proper objects of government;' "03 and (2) "the
execution of the laws of the national government. . . should not
require the intervention of the State Legislatures.' 10 4 Hamilton
might be amused to see his attack on the Articles of Confedera-
tion become a blueprint for a new form of federalism. Concern-
ing the Articles of Confederation, Hamilton had stated "that
though in theory their resolutions concerning those objects are
laws constitutionally binding on the members of the Union, yet
in practice they are mere recommendations which the States ob-
serve or disregard at their option."'1 05 In writing Number 15,
Hamilton never meant to exempt the states from federal power:
"The measures of the Union have not been executed; and the
delinquencies of the States have step by step matured them-
selves to an extreme, which has, at length, arrested all the
wheels of the national government and brought them to an aw-
ful stand." 108
Like Justice O'Connor, Justice Powell defended a broad in-
terpretation of the tenth amendment in Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission v. Wyoming,10 7 relying on Madison's
Number 45:
The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the
Federal Government, are few and defined. Those which are to
remain in the State Governments are numerous and indefinite.
The former will be exercised principally on external objects, as
war, peace, negotiation, and foreign commerce .... The pow-
ers reserved to the several States will extend to all the objects,
102. 456 U.S. 742 (1982) (upholding congressional power affecting state owned
utilities).
103. Id. at 792 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting
THE FEDERALIST, supra note 1, No. 15 at 109 (A. Hamilton)).
104. 456 U.S. at 793. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quot-
ing THE FEDERALIST, supra note 1, No. 16 at 117 (A. Hamilton)).
105. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 1, No. 15 at 108 (A. Hamilton).
106. Id. at 112.
107. 460 U.S. 226 (1983) (Justice Powell dissented from a decision upholding age
discrimination suits against the states).
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which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, liber-
ties and properties of the people; and the internal order, im-
provement, and prosperity of the State.108
Justice Powell's view of limited federal power over state activity
can be contrasted with Justice Brennan's view in Usery that the
federal government ought to be able to legislate when needed
even though that legislation directly affects state activity. It is
apparent that The Federalist's ambiguous language can be in-
voked by both sides to support desired conclusions.
In Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Author-
ity1°9 five justices, who had whittled Usery down virtually to its
facts in such cases as Federal Energy Regulatory Commission v.
Mississippi, held that since so little remained of Usery and since
that remainder was "both impractical and doctrinally barren," 110
Usery should be overruled. Both the majority and the dissent
invoked The Federalist to support their positions. The majority
argued that the authors of The Federalist sought to protect
state sovereignty through the Constitutional struc-
ture-primarily through equal state representation in the Sen-
ate."' The dissenters turned to several sections in The Federal-
ist written to assuage Anti-Federalist fears of central
government tyranny, supporting the theme that the national
government was limited to "certain enumerated objects.""' 2
Either side could have initially pointed out that The Feder-
alist was written prior to the passage of the tenth amendment.
But even assuming The Federalist's relevance, both sides could
have used it more effectively. The majority could have cited
Number 44 to undercut the dissent's limited construction of the
national power: "No axiom is more clearly established in law, or
in reason than wherever the end is required, the means are au-
108. Id. at 271 (Powell, J., dissenting) (quoting THE FEDERALIST, supra note 1, No.
45 at 292-93 (J. Madison)).
In another example of The Federalist's use in support of state powers, Justice Ste-
vens made a general reference to Number 32 to reinforce the proposition that "[t]he
exercise of State authority in a field traditionally occupied by State law will not be
deemed preempted by a federal statute unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of
Congress." Southland Corp. v. Keating, 104 S. Ct. 852, 862 (1984) (Stevens, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part).
109. 105 S. Ct. 1005 (1985).
110. Id. at 1021.
111. Id. at 1018.
112. Id. at 1028 (Powell, J., dissenting) (quoting THE FEDERALIST, supra note 1, No.
39 at 245 (J. Madison)).
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thorized; whenever a general power to do a thing is given, every
particular power necessary for doing it is included." ' 13 The ma-
jority also could have turned to The Federalist's discussion of
the commerce clause, instead of maintaining debate on an ab-
stract level: "The regulation of commerce, it is true, is a new
power; but that seems to be an addition which few oppose and
from which no apprehensions are entertained.""
14
Writing for the dissent Justice Powell began his historical
discussion with quotations from Anti-Federalists, followed by
extensive citation of The Federalist."5 Since the authors of The
Federalist frequently adopted the rhetorical technique of as-
suming the legitimacy of the opponent's position, it is difficult to
isolate the authors' intentions: "The proposed Constitution,
therefore, even when tested by the rules laid down by its antago-
nists, is, in strictness, neither a national nor a federal Constitu-
tion, but a composition of both."""6 Nevertheless, Justice Powell
demonstrated that Publius articulated a substantive division be-
tween state and federal power: "The operations of the federal
government will be most extensive and important in times of
war and danger; those of the State government in times of peace
and security."1 7 Justice Powell thus used The Federalist to re-
fute the majority's argument that the Constitution's structure
was to be the exclusive protection of state sovereignty. But Pow-
ell could have further diminished the majority's reliance on such
structural protections as Senate representation by showing that
Madison wrongly assumed, based upon experiences under the
Articles of Confederation, that "the members of the federal leg-
islature will be likely to attach themselves too much to local ob-
113. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 1, No. 44 at 285 (J. Madison). There are other
sections supporting a broad grant under delegated powers: "[fln the sources from which
the ordinary powers of government are drawn, it is partly federal and partly national; in
the operation of these powers, it is national, not federal . . . ." THE FEDERALIST, supra
note 1, No. 39 at 246 (J. Madison).
114. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 1, No. 45 at 293 (J. Madison). This generous read-
ing of the commerce clause readily follows the quotation used by the dissent from Num-
ber 45, and thus undercuts any argument that The Federalist supported a narrow con-
struction of that clause. See also THE FEDERALIST, supra note 1, No. 22 at 143-44 (A.
Hamilton) ("It is indeed evident, on the most superficial view, that there is no object,
either as it respects the interest of trade or finance, that more strongly demands a fed-
eral superintendence.").
115. Garcia, 105 S. Ct. at 1027-29.
116. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 1, No. 39 at 246 (J. Madison).
117. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 1, No. 45 at 293 (J. Madison).
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jects."' 8 But then Powell would also have had to face Madison's
version of the "changed times" argument:
If, therefore, as has been elsewhere remarked, the people
should in future become more partial to the federal than to the
State governments, the change can only result from such mani-
fest and irresistible proofs of a better administration as will
overcome all their antecedent propensities. And in that case,
the people ought not surely to be precluded from giving most
of their confidence where they may discover it to be most due
119
Both sides would possibility have cited The Federalist with
less conviction had they recalled one of its more humble
passages:
Not less arduous must have been the task of marking the
proper line of partition between the authority of the general
and that of the State governments. Every man will be sensible
of this difficulty in proportion as he has been accustomed to
contemplate and discriminate objects extensive and compli-
cated in their nature.
120
2. Executive power
The Court has frequently used The Federalist to define and
expand executive power. In Hines v. Davidowitz12' Justice Black
referred to The Federalist to determine that federal alien laws
could preempt state alien registration laws: "The importance of
national power in all matters relating to foreign affairs and the
inherent danger of state action in this field are clearly developed
in Federalist papers No. 3, 4, 5, 42, and 80.''122 Justice Frank-
furter also quoted The Federalist to uphold the Smith Act in
Dennis v. United States:123 "The right of a government to main-
tain its existence-self-preservation-is the most pervasive as-
pect of sovereignty. 'Security against foreign danger,' wrote
Madison, 'is one of the primitive objects of civil society.' ,,124
118. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 1, No. 46 at 296 (J. Madison).
119. Id. at 295.
120. THE: FEDERALIST, supra note 1, No. 37 at 227 (J. Madison).
121. 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
122. Id. at 62 n.9.
123. 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
124. Id. at 519 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (quoting THE FEDERALIST supra note 1,
No. 41 at 256 (J. Madison)).
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In Reid v. Covert125 Justice Black held that civilian defen-
dants could not be tried by a court martial for a capital crime.
He emphasized Madison's fear of the military: "And those who
adopted the Constitution embodied their profound fear and dis-
trust of military power, as well as their determination to protect
trial by jury, in the Constitution and its Amendments. '126 In-
deed, "[t]heir fears were rooted in history. They knew that an-
cient republics had been overthrown by their military
leaders.
'127
Chief Justice Vinson dissented from a decision holding un-
constitutional President Truman's seizure of steel mills in
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer.'28 He quoted from
The Federalist-"Energy in the Executive is a leading character
in the definition of good government"129-and paraphrased the
argument from Hamilton's defense of Washington's Proclama-
tion of Neutrality that "the Executive has the duty to do that
which will preserve peace until Congress acts.'
30
Justice Harlan dissented from a decision limiting military
courts-martial to service-related offenses. He also employed
Hamilton's words: "[T]he government of the armed forces
'ought to exist without limitation: Because it is impossible to
foresee or define the extent and variety of national exigencies, or
the corresponding extent & variety of the means which may be
necessary to satisfy them.' "'
Justice Powell turned to The Federalist to justify deference
to Congress in its establishment of peacetime armies. He held
that Congress could condition student loans on applicants' state-
ments that they had registered for the draft.1
3 2
Justice O'Connor recently referred to Jay's Number 64 to
support the general proposition that treaties have not been ab-
rogated unless constitutional procedures are complied with.1
33
125. 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
126. Id. at 29.
127. Id. at 24.
128. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
129. Id. at 682 (Vinson, C.J., dissenting) (quoting THE FEDERALIST, supra note 1,
No. 70 at 423 (A. Hamilton)).
130. 343 U.S. at 683-84.
131. O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 277 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (quoting
THE FEDERALIST, supra note 1, No. 23 at 153 (A. Hamilton)).
132. Selective Serv. Sys. v. Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group, 104 S. Ct.
3348, 3360 & n.3 (1984).
133. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 104 S. Ct. 1776, 1783 (1984).
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As a result, erosion of the gold standard did not terminate either
the United States' obligation to comply with the Warsaw Con-
vention gold-based liability limit or Congress's delegation of au-
thority to the Civil Aeronautics Board to convert liability limits
into dollars.
3. Separation of powers
The modern Court has also frequently referred to The Fed-
eralist in cases raising the issue of separation of powers. Con-
taining several different conceptions of the proper distribution
of federal power, The Federalist embraced Montesquieu's doc-
trine of separating governmental powers but left the precise im-
plementation for later generations.
In his dissent in Myers v. United States,1 34 Justice Mc-
Reynolds cited The Federalist's support of legislative supremacy
over the hiring and firing of executive officials. The majority had
upheld the power of the President unilaterally to dismiss a post-
master. Justice McReynolds, quoting Hamilton from Number 77
stated that "[t]he consent of [the Senate] would be necessary to
displace as well as appoint.1 35 Chief Justice Taft replied that
Hamilton's later works showed that Hamilton, as Secretary of
the Treasury, changed his position, believing that President
Washington did not need to consult the Senate."3 6
In United States v. Brown 37 the Court held that Congress
created a bill of attainder by passing a law that made criminal a
Communist Party member's sitting on the executive board of a
labor union. Chief Justice Warren cited Hamilton and The Fed-
eralist to show that the prohibition against bills of attainder
served the goal of diffusing power by reducing the legislative
temptation to "gratify momentary passions.' ' 315
Additionally, Chief Justice Warren consulted The Federal-
ist and Charles Warren's The Making of the Constitution3 9 to
justify the narrow limits of Congress's power to expel its own
members in Powell v. McCormack.14 After citing Elliot's De-
134. 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
135. Id. at 208 (McReynolds, J., dissenting) (quoting THE FEDERALIST, supra note 1,
No. 77 at 459 (A. Hamilton)).
136. 272 U.S. at 137.
137. 381 U.S. 437 (1965).
138. Id. at 444.
139. C. WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION (1928).
140. 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
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bates, Chief Justice Warren emphasized this quotation from The
Federalist: "The qualifications of the persons who may choose
or be chosen, as has been remarked upon other occasions, are
defined and fixed in the Constitution, and are unalterable by the
legislature.
'141
When faced with a separation of powers argument in Buck-
ley v. Valeo,142 the Court held that it could appropriately decide
the constitutionality of laws regulating federal elections. Justice
Powell, who joined in the opinion, saw no need to refer to his
previous characterization of The Federalist in United States v.
Richardson:143 "These holdings and declarations reflect a wise
view of the need for judicial restraint if we are to preserve the
Judiciary as the branch 'least dangerous to the political rights of
the Constitution.' ,144
President Nixon twice failed in his attempt to argue that
separation of powers doctrine protected him. The Court allowed
the Watergate Special Prosecutor to pursue a subpoena duces
tecum in United States v. Nixon 45 and allowed the General
Service Administration to obtain access to presidential records
in Nixon v. Administrator of General Services.146 The Court
praised Madison's flexible interpretation of Montesquieu:
"[W]here the whole power of one department is exercised by the
same hands which possesses the whole power of another depart-
ment, the fundamental principles of a free constitution, are sub-
verted. 1 47 In his dissent, Justice Rehnquist questioned this
interpretation:
As a matter of original inquiry, it might plausibly be claimed
that the concerns expressed by the Framers of the Constitution
during their debates, and similar expressions found in the Fed-
eralist Papers, by no means require the conclusion that the Ju-
dicial Branch is the ultimate arbiter of whether one branch has
transgressed upon powers constitutionally reserved to another.
It could have been plausibly maintained that the Framers
141. Id. at 539 (quoting THE FEDERALIST, supra note 1, No. 60 at 371 (A. Hamilton))
(emphasis omitted).
142. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
143. 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
144. Id. at 193 (Powell, J., concurring) (quoting TsE FEDERALIST, supra note 1, No.
78 at 465 (A. Hamilton)).
145. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
146. 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
147. Id. at 442 n.5 (quoting THE FEDERALIST, supra note 1, No. 47 at 302-03 (J.
Madison)).
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thought that the Constitution itself had armed each branch
with sufficient political weapons to fend off intrusions by an-
other which would violate the principle of separation of pow-
ers, and that therefore there was neither warrant nor necessity
for judicial invalidation of such intrusion. But that is not the
way the law has developed in this Court."8
Nixon later prevailed when he pled presidential immunity to
tort actions in Nixon v. Fitzgerald.149 Although the prevailing
opinion did not discuss The Federalist, Justice White noted in
his dissent that Hamilton never stated whether impeachment
and subsequent criminal prosecution were the only means, ex-
clusive of tort action, to challenge presidential wrongdoing.1 ' °
In Industrial Union Department v. American Petroleum
Institute,'51 Justice Rehnquist was not as squeamish about judi-
cial restraint as he had been in Furman v. Georgia.152 Rehnquist
concluded that the OSHA provision regulating unsafe work
places violated the separation of powers doctrine: "The rule
against delegation of legislative power is not, however, so cardi-
nal a principle as to allow for no exception. The Framers of the
Constitution were practical statesmen, who saw that the doc-
trine of separation of powers was a two-sided coin. '153 Justice
Marshall, dissenting, responded that by striking OSHA's regula-
tion the Court was improperly making law, not interpreting the
law. 1
54
In Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha
55
Chief Justice Burger referred to Hamilton's fear of legislative
supremacy. The Court held that a single branch of Congress
could not invalidate an administrative agency decision to deport
an alien because such action would grant Congress too much
power. In addition, Burger quoted The Federalist several times
to demonstrate the broad scope of Presidential veto powers.
56
Justice White dissented, invoking Madison's observation that
the separation of powers doctrine was violated primarily "where
the whole power of one department is exercised by the same
148. 433 U.S. at 559 n.7 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
149. 457 U.S. 731 (1982).
150. Id. at 773 (White, J., dissenting).
151. 448 U.S. 607 (1980).
152. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
153. 448 U.S. at 673 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
154. 448 U.S. at 688 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
155. 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983).
156. Id. at 2782-83.
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hands which possess the whole power of another department.' 157
Thus, according to Justice White, the one-house legislative veto
of administrative actions did not violate separation of powers
doctrine.
4. Civil rights
The nineteenth century Court resorted to The Federalist
primarily to protect property rights-to help apply the bill of
attainder, ex post facto, and impairment of contract clauses. But
these sections also protected other civil rights, such as the prac-
tice of law by ex-confederate lawyers in Ex Parte Garland.'58
The modern Court thus had precedent to void a congressional
law prohibiting the compensation of named government employ-
ees except under narrow circumstances.' 9
Further, in Weaver v. Graham10 the Court used the ex post
facto clause to strike down a Florida statute repealing "good
time" sentence reductions that prisoners had previously re-
ceived. The Court stated: "Through this prohibition, the Fram-
ers sought to assure that legislative Acts give fair warning of
their effect and permit individuals to rely on their meaning until
explicitly changed."'-'
In Bute v. Illinois12 a man convicted of several sexual of-
fenses argued that he had a right to counsel. Justice Burton
replied:
One of the major contributions to the science of government
that was made by the Constitution of the United States was its
division of powers between the states and the Federal Govern-
ment. The compromise between state rights and those of a cen-
tral government was fully considered in securing the ratifica-
tion of the Constitution in 1787 and 1788.163
Justice Burton concluded that the Framers would have opposed
federal regulation of state criminal procedures.
Dissenting from a decision upholding a search and seizure
based upon a reliable informant's tip, Justice Douglas quoted
157. Id. at 2809 n.25 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting THE FEDERALIST, supra note 1,
No. 47 at 302-03 (J. Madison)).
158. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1867).
159. United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946).
160. 450 U.S. 24 (1981).
161. Id. at 28-29.
162. 333 U.S. 640 (1948).
163. Id. at 650 (emphasis added).
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The Federalist in Draper v. United States:6 4 "Hamilton wrote
about 'the practice of arbitrary imprisonments' which he de-
nounced as 'the favorite and most formidable instruments of
tyranny.' "165
Even though it opposed a Bill of Rights, 66 The Federalist
was used several times to broadly interpret the first amendment.
Justice Black in Talley v. California6 held unconstitutional a
state ordinance that required every handbill to include the name
and address of anyone who prepared, distributed, or sponsored
it. He observed, "Even the Federalist Papers, written in favor of
the adoption of our Constitution, were published under fictitious
names. It is plain that anonymity has sometimes been assumed
for the most constructive purposes.' ' 6 But Justice O'Connor
made a passing reference to Madison's Letter Number 10 in
Minnesota State Board for Community Colleges v. Knight 69 to
support her decision that a state statute could limit opportuni-
ties by university employees to be heard by allowing only collec-
tive bargaining representatives to discuss nonmandatory bar-
gaining issues. Her apparent conclusion that Madison assumed
that public participation must be limited in republican forms of
government is tenuous since Madison was contrasting the safety
of larger republics to the dangers of smaller republics. Thus,
Madison might have disagreed with O'Connor's conclusion that
the state law in Knight did not violate the first amendment.
70
In his concurring opinion in School District of Abington
Township v. Schempp,17 1 Justice Brennan stressed Madison's
sensitivity to the relationship between freedom of religion and
other civil liberties: "Madison suggested in the Fifty-first Feder-
164. 358 U.S. 307 (1959).
165. Id. at 317 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoting THE FEDERALIST, supra note 1, No.
84 at 512 (A. Hamilton)). Since no justices would claim to uphold "arbitrary imprison-
ments," Hamilton's quotation also could have been used by the majority.
166. Justice Stevens argued that this original hostility to the Bill of Rights supports
a broad interpretation of the ninth amendment since it was based upon a fear that only
enumerated rights would be protected. Massachusetts v. Upton, 104 S. Ct. 2085, 2090
(1984) (Stevens, J., concurring).
167. 362 U.S. 60 (1960).
168. Id. at 65.
169. 104 S. Ct. 1058, 1066 (1984).
170. Madison argued in Number 10 that even state republican governments are too
small to be safe since we cannot be assured of good leaders and there will not be suffi-
cient obstacles to factions (such as a union). THE FEDERALIST, supra note 1, No. 10 at 82
(J. Madison); see also D. EPSTEIN, THE PoLrmIcA THEORY OF THE FEDERAIST 108-09
(1984).
171. 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (outlawing school prayer).
HeinOnline  -- 1985 BYU L. Rev. 95 1985
96 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
alist that the religious diversity which existed at the time of the
Constitutional Convention constituted a source of strength for
religious freedom, much as the multiplicity of economic and po-
litical interests enhanced the security of other civil rights.
'172
In one of the rare instances when a justice turned to The
Federalist to explore more abstract questions of political sci-
ence, Justice Brennan quoted Madison in Brown v. Hartlage.1
73
He explained how the public good emerged from private inter-
ests in a democratic system: "In the extended republic of the
United States, and among the great variety of interests, parties
and sects which it embraces, a coalition of a majority of the
whole society could seldom take place on any other principles
than those of justice and the general good."'" 4 Justice Brennan
then remarked that the first amendment enhanced this process
by allowing candidates great latitude in appealing to the voter's
self-interest. Therefore, a state court could not construe a state
law, which prohibited material benefits to voters, to void an
election in which a candidate promised to reduce his salary be-
low that "fixed by law. '"1 5
Justice Goldberg used The Federalist to help interpret the
ninth amendment in Griswold v. Connecticut.176 Justice
Goldberg first pointed out that the amendment was offered to
assuage fears that no specific bill of rights could cover all essen-
tial rights. He then quoted The Federalist in a footnote:
"Madison himself had previously pointed out the dangers of in-
accuracy resulting from the fact that 'no language is so copious
as to supply words and phrases for every complex idea.' "'
Justice Blackmun consulted The Federalist in an opinion
concerning the privileges and immunities clause. He dissented
from a decision outlawing a municipal ordinance requiring forty
percent of all employees of contractors working on city construc-
tion projects to be local residents. He invoked The Federalist to
172. Id. at 240 n.8 (Brennan, J., concurring).
173. 456 U.S. 45 (1982).
174. Id. at 56 n.7 (quoting THE FEDERALIST, supra note 1, No. 51 at 325 (J.
Madison)). Brennan also referred to Madison's Number 10. 456 U.S. at 56 n.7. This let-
ter, which Charles Beard made famous, was only cited in three other cases. See Storer v.
Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 736 (1974); Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 813 (1983) (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting); Minnesota State Bd., 104 S. Ct. at 1066 (1984).
175. 456 U.S. at 55-58.
176. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
177. Id. at 488 n.3 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (quoting THE FEDERALIST, supra note
1, No. 37 at 229 (J. Madison)).
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support his thesis that the privileges and immunities clause was
intended to regulate interstate, not intrastate, discrimination."' 5
5. "Changed times" argument
While several justices have used The Federalist to support
their theories of constitutional interpretation, justices with com-
peting theories have invoked the "changed times" argument to
diminish The Federalist's influence. Chief Justice Hughes
openly rejected The Federalist when he held in Home Building
& Loan Association v. Blaisdell"9 that the prohibition against
impairment of contracts did not prevent Minnesota from pass-
ing a statute that temporarily extended the time for redeeming
real property from foreclosure. In his bitterly argued dissent,
Justice Sutherland quoted Madison's Number 44:
[O]ne legislative interference is but the first link of a long
chain of repetitions, every subsequent interference being natu-
rally produced by the effects of the preceding. They very
rightly infer, therefore, that some thorough reform is wanting,
which will banish speculations on public measures, inspire a
general prudence and industry, and give a regular course to the
business of society.180
Justice Douglas believed that the fourteenth amendment al-
tered the Framer's original definition of equality. Hamilton's
fearful conception of voting equality was set forth in Number 68:
"Talents for low intrigue and the little arts of popularity may
alone suffice to elevate a man to the first honors in a single state
.... 181 Douglas believed such a fear "belongs to a bygone day,
and should not be considered in determining what the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires in
statewide elections.
1 82
Writing for a unanimous Court in Singer v. United
States,1 83 Chief Justice Warren held that a defendant did not
have a right to demand a bench trial. Warren noted that The
Federalist's argument reflected colonial legal practices: "[B]ut,
178. United Bldg. & Const. Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden, 104 S. Ct. 1020,
1031 (1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
179. 290 U.S. 398, 427-29 (1934).
180. Id. at 464 (Sutherland, J., dissenting) (quoting THE FEDERALIST, supra note 1,
No. 44 at 283 (J. Madison)).
181. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 1, No. 68 at 414 (A. Hamilton).
182. Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 377 n.8 (1963).
183. 380 U.S. 24 (1965).
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since the practice of permitting defendants a choice as to the
mode of trial was not widespread, it is not surprising that some
of the framers apparently believed that the Constitution desig-
nated trial by jury as the exclusive method of determining guilt
"184
In his opinion in United States v. Brewster'8 5 Chief Justice
Burger held that a former senator could be prosecuted despite
the speech and debate clause. He defended his opinion by mini-
mizing the argument that a ruthless prosecutor could attack the
legislature by calling campaign contributions bribes. Noting that
each branch of government potentially has the power to abuse
the others, Chief Justice Burger quoted Hamilton to show that
congressional control of the budget was the basis for the Fram-
ers' fear of legislative tyranny. Rejecting both Justice White's
fear of an abusive executive and The Federalist's concerns of
abusive branches of government, Chief Justice Burger stated,
"The check-and-balance mechanism, buttressed by unfettered
debate in an open society with a free press, has not encouraged
abuses of power or tolerated them long when they arose." 186
In Parden v. Terminal Railway 11 Justice Brennan faced a
state sovereign immunity defense based on the eleventh amend-
ment. The defense was supported by The Federalist's strong en-
dorsement of sovereign immunity, and cases using The Federal-
ist to justify a sovereign immunity defense. Rather than reject
the immunity defense based on the changed times argument,
Justice Brennan concluded that The Federalist's discussion of
sovereign immunity only concerned state debt obligations. 8 He
concluded that a state could not assert the immunity after waiv-
184. Id. at 31.
185. 408 U.S. 501 (1972).
186. Id. at 523. Burger did not revive this analysis, as he could have, when he dra-
matically limited legislative power in the more recent Immigration and Naturalization
Service v. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983).
187. 377 U.S. 184 (1964).
188. Hamilton's argument certainly did not seem to be limited to immediate
concerns:
It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an
individual without its consent. This is the general sense and the general prac-
tice of mankind; and the exemption, as one of the attributes of sovereignty, is
now enjoyed by the government of every State in the Union. Unless, therefore,
there is a surrender of this immunity in the plan of the convention, it will
remain with the States and the danger intimated must be merely ideal.
THE FEDERALIST, supra note 1, No. 81 at 487-88 (A. Hamilton).
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ing it by operating a common carrier covered by the Federal
Employers' Liability Act.
C. The Court's Current Methodology
The primary impression one gets from this long and arid
survey of almost two hundred cases is that the Court has never
significantly altered its techniques for using The Federalist in
constitutional adjudication. Passages have been cited (although
frequently out of context), ignored (although The Federalist had
been shown to support an opposing argument), or even rejected
(when the changed times argument dictated a different result),
depending on the position a justice wanted to advance. Rarely
has the Court gone beyond the immediate passages of The Fed-
eralist to determine its meaning or significance. Indeed, The
Federalist has been relied on mostly as a means of persuasion.
Relying only on the Court's limited historical inquiry, one
has little idea of the actual beliefs of The Federalist's authors.
Nor does one have much sense of the authors themselves or of
the times in which they lived. Furthermore, no justice has ex-
plained where historical inquiry should begin-with colonial
times, the Constitutional Convention, the writing of The Feder-
alist, the articulation of and response to Anti-Federalist argu-
ments, the ratification debates, or postratification actions. Fur-
thermore, the justices have not considered the position of the
Anti-Federalists or the positions of voters at state ratification
conventions. In fact, the Court's frequent reliance on The Feder-
alist to determine the meaning of the Constitution arguably con-
flicts with the Framers' intentions. Madison said: "If we were to
look, therefore, for the meaning of [the Constitution] beyond the
face of the instrument, we must look for it, not in the General
Convention which proposed, but in the State Conventions which
accepted and ratified it."'' 19 Indeed, the state ratifying conven-
tions, which included a broad cross section of representatives,
could reveal more about the intentions and motives of the aver-
age voter than could The Federalist.
Of course, neither the justices nor practicing constitutional
lawyers can be expected to study all primary and secondary
sources that discuss the creation of the Constitution.'9 How-
189. C. WAnREN, supra note 139, at 794.
190. Forrest McDonald spent twenty thousand hours researching his books on the
creation of the Constitution. D. ADAmR, Fame and the Founding Fathers, in FAMz AND
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ever, relying on only a few sources to determine the intentions of
the Framers results in courts and lawyers receiving no benefit
from the extensive research of constitutional historians. Histori-
ans have organized and edited numerous primary materials and
have proposed a fascinating variety of theories explaining why
the Constitution was created and accepted. One could reach dif-
ferent solutions to several current constitutional ques-
tions-particularly pertaining to the proper relationship be-
tween the states and the federal government-depending on
which of many historical interpretations one accepts or which
era one emphasizes. Thus one plunges into the historiography of
The Federalist and the Constitution, learning from both exten-
sive research and competing theories.
IV. THE HISTORIANS' VIEW OF The Federalist AND THE
CONSTITUTION
Virtually all nineteenth century constitutional historians
agreed that the Constitution's ratification was a political tri-
umph of patriotism and rationality over parochialism. However,
Beard's thesis that the Constitution was a triumph of economic
self-interest destroyed that consensus about the Framers' mo-
tives. Understandably, Beard's work provoked many re-
sponses-both for and against his thesis. A glance at each of
these segments of the study of constitutional history-the Fed-
eralist historians, Beard's interpretation, and responses to
Beard-illuminates the struggle to ratify the Constitution.
A. The Federalist Historians
The view that the Constitution's ratification was a political
triumph of patriotism and rationality over parochialism was wel-
comed by a Supreme Court dominated by Chief Justice Mar-
shall, who had written a glowing biography of George Washing-
ton between 1804 and 1807.191 Additionally, Chief Justice Story,
who wrote his Commentaries on the Constitution of the United
States192 in 1833, maintained a Federalist perspective after he
reached the bench. Story praised The Federalist as "a cele-
THE FOUNDING FATHERS 22 (1974).
191. J. MARSHALL, THE LIFE OF GEORGE WASHINGTON (1926 ed. Fredericksburg, Va.)
(lst ed. Philadelphia 1804-1807).
192. J. STORY, supra note 29.
HeinOnline  -- 1985 BYU L. Rev. 100 1985
THE FEDERALIST PAPERS
brated commentary."'1 93 A typical section of Story's Commenta-
ries frequently referred to Kent's Commentaries, Rawle's works,
Elliot's Debates, and The Federalist. For example, while study-
ing the commerce clause, Story cited The Federalist fourteen
times, Rawle's works twice, and Kent's works five times. 1 4 Story
extolled Kent's work: "I gladly avail myself to this, as well as of
all other occasions, to recommend his learned labors to those
who seek to study the law, the Constitution, with a liberal and
enlightened spirit."'1
While Story frequently referred to Kent in his works, Kent
also cited Story and The Federalist in his Commentaries. Kent
acclaimed: "I know not, indeed, of any work on the principles of
free government that is to be compared, in instruction and in-
trinsic value, to this small and unpretending volume of the Fed-
eralist; not even if we resort to Aristotle, Cicero, Machiavel,
Montesquieu, Milton, Locke, or Burke."196
Historian George Curtis found that The Federalist was re-
ally Hamilton's triumph:
He was very ably assisted in the Federalist by Madison and
Jay; but it was from him that the Federalist derived the weight
and the power which commanded the careful attention of the
country, and carried conviction to the great body of intelligent
men in all parts of the Union.'97
As Douglass Adair pointed out in 1944, historians who support a
strong central government have preferred Hamilton to Madison,
while historians who support a limited central government have
preferred Madison to Hamilton. 98 Historians' conclusions about
which statesman authored which letters were apparently dic-
tated by their political assessments of Hamilton and Madison.
193. United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 158 (1820).
194. 2 J. STORY, supra note 29, at 1-44.
195. Id. at 14 n.5.
196. 1 J. KENT, supra note 30, at 241 n.b. Kent, an admirer of Hamilton, wrote in
1787, before The Federalist was even completed: "You may praise whom you please, and
I will presume to say that I think 'Publius' is a more admirable writer and wields the
sword of party dispute with justice, energy, and inconceivable dexterity. The author
must be Alexander Hamilton, who.., in genius and political research, is not inferior to
Gibbon, Hume, and Montesquieu." B. MTCHELL, supra note 24, at 630 n.2.
197. 1 G. CuRTis, supra note 31, at 417.
198. D. ADmR, The Authorship of the Disputed Federalist Papers, in FAMSE AND THE
FOUNDING FATHERS 27 (1974).
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In 1888 John Fiske wrote the influential The Critical Period
of American History, 1783-1789.199 As the title implies, Fiske
stated that the political and economic problems under the Arti-
cles of Confederation had reached a critical stage. Only a strong
central government under the new Constitution could save the
new Republic. Fiske sought to confirm Hamilton's allegations in
Numbers 15-22 that the Articles of Confederation were fatally
weak.
This deferential political history, which Charles Beard later
labeled "juristic" history,200 never totally prevailed. Many of the
justices and the historians were also aware of economic influ-
ence. After all, Madison had acknowledged in Letter Number 10
that economics is a major cause of faction.20 1 Madison appar-
ently had been influenced by the eighteenth century British the-
orist Harrington. Harrington wrote in Oceana that "empire fol-
lows the balance of property, '20 2 and that a bicameral legislature
and a written constitution were needed to create political stabil-
ity between the natural aristocracy and the masses.20 3 In his bi-
ography of Washington, Chief Justice Marshall described the
conflict between indulgent creditors and strict creditors as a cru-
cial dividing line in the constitutional debate.20 4 In 1853 the his-
torian Hildreth asked: "The clergy, the nobles, the kings, the
burghers have all had their turn. Is there never to be an Age of
the People-of the working classes?
'20 5
Before the turn of the century, Frederick Jackson Turner
revolutionized American historical analysis by adapting Italian
economist Achille Loria's theory of the primacy of land.0 6 In ad-
dition, in 1907 J. Allen Smith described the antidemocratic as-
pects of the Constitution in The Spirit of American Govern-
ment.20 7 Other historians, such as Libby and Seligman, also
emphasized economic factors influencing the creation of the
199. J. FisKE, THE CRITICAL PERIOD OF AMERICAN HISTORY, 1783-1789 (1888).
200. "In fact, the juristic theory of the origin and nature of the Constitution is
marked by the same lack of analysis of determining forces which characterized older
historical writing in general." C. BEARD, supra note 8, at 10.
201. "[Tlhe most common and durable source of factions has been the verious [sic]
and unequal distribution of property." THE FEDERALIST, supra note 1, No. 10 at 79 (J.
Madison).
202. See 1 V.L. PARRINGTON, MAIN CURRENTS IN AMERICAN THOUGHT 269 (1927).
203. Id.
204. 4 J. MARSHALL, supra note 191, at 193-95.
205. R. HILDRETH, THEORY OF POLITICS 267 (1854 & photo. reprint 1971).
206. See, e.g., L. BENSON, TURNER AND BEARD 1-40 (1960).
207. J.A. SMITH, THE SPIRIT OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT (1907 & photo. reprint 1965).
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Constitution. °8 Later, Charles Beard relied heavily upon sec-
ondary sources to present his thesis. In fact, Beard acknowl-
edged the work of Turner, Libby, Ambler, and Schaper in his
Preface to An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of
the United States.20 9
B. Beard's Economic Interpretation of the Constitution
Beard's thesis that the Constitution was a triumph of dy-
namic capital interests (which he called personalty) over in-
debted realty interests210 destroyed the already deteriorating
historical consensus about the Framers' motives. According to
Beard, the delegates' positions show that this economic division
existed at the Constitutional Convention and during the subse-
quent ratification process. Beard added spice to his argument by
revealing that many delegates who supported the Constitution
owned depreciated government securities that would increase in
value if a strong central government with coercive taxing power
were created.211 Although he never claimed that the Framers
were solely interested in immediate profit, Beard evidently
thought that this information deflated the juristic historians' be-
lief that patriotism and reason had triumphed.
In the first paragraph of his book, Beard distinguished his
work from that of Bancroft, who interpreted the ratification pro-
cess as "the movement of the divine power which gives unity to
the universe, and order and connection to events."21 2 According
to Beard, The Federalist proved that the Framers were sensitive
208. E. SELIGMAN, THE ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY (2d ed. 3d printing
1917); Libby, The Geographical Distribution of the Vote of the Thirteen States on the
Federal Constitution, 1787-8, 1 BULL. U. Wis. 1 (1894). Beard quoted Seligman's work:
The existence of man depends upon his ability to sustain himself; the economic
life is therefore the fundamental condition of all life. Since human life, how-
ever, is the life of man in society, individual existence moves within the frame-
work of the social structure and is modified by it. What the conditions of main-
tenance are to the individual, the similar relations of production and
consumption are to the community. To economic causes, therefore, must be
traced in the last instance those transformations in the structure of society
which themselves condition the relations of social classes and the various mani-
festations of social life.
C. BEARD, supra note 8, at 15 (quoting E. SELGMAN, supra, at 3).
209. C. BEARD, supra note 8, at xix.
210. Id. at 324-35.
211. Id. at 149-50.
212. Id. at 1 (quoting 2 G. BANCROFT, THE HISTORY OF THE FORMATION OF THE CON-
STITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 284 (1882)).
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to economic forces. Referring to The Federalist he said: "This
wonderful piece of argumentation ... is in fact the finest study
in the economic interpretation of politics which exists in any
language; and whoever would understand the Constitution as an
economic document need hardly go beyond it.
' '213
By highlighting Madison's theory of faction in Letter Num-
ber 10, Beard revived Madison's reputation, which had previ-
ously diminished in comparison to that of his colleague Hamil-
ton.214 But Beard's Madison was no angel; Madison created
several restraints to the power of democracy: "And the crowning
counterweight to 'an interested and over-bearing majority,' as
Madison phrased it, was secured in the peculiar position as-
signed to the judiciary, and the use of the sanctity and mystery
of the law as a foil to democratic attacks." 15
Beard consistently denied the allegation that his book was
conceived to support the Progressive Movement by showing that
the current conservative reliance on the Framers reflected not
simple patriotism, but economic motives.2"' Critics such as Rich-
213. C. BEARD, supra note 8, at 153.
214. D. ADAIR, The Tenth Federalist Revisited, in FAME AND THE FOUNDING FATHERS
75 (1974).
215. C. BEARD, supra note 8, at 161. Beard's legal mystification argument is an obvi-
ous antecedent to the current critical legal jurisprudence movement. See Unger, The
Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARv. L. REv. 563 (1983); see generally THE PoLrr-
ICS OF LAw (D. Kairys ed. 1982). Indeed, Beard frequently used the adjective "critical" to
distinguish his form of analysis from the more traditional schools: "Nor has England
advanced far beyond us in the critical interpretation of legal evolution-its explanation
in terms of, or in relation to, the shifting economic processes and methods in which the
law is tangled." C. BEARD, supra note 8, at 7-8 (emphasis added).
Beard also sought to improve upon the work of historians such as Bancroft, who
argued that the Constitution resulted from divine guidance. Richard Hofstadter later
replied that Bancroft was not as mystical as Beard claimed. R. HOFSTADTER, THE PRO-
GRESSIVE HISTORIANS 20 (1968). Beard also rejected the "Teutonic Historians," who saw
the Constitution as additional proof of Anglo-Saxon racial superiority. Finally, Beard
wanted to distinguish his truly scientific work from the scientific historians who claimed
to present only data, not ideas: "Such historical writing, however, bears somewhat the
same relation to scientific history which systematic botany bears to ecology; that is, it
classifies and orders phenomena, but does not explain their proximate or remote causes
and relations." C. BEARD, supra note 8, at 4. One can maintain a more benign view of
judicial review:
[T]he Federalist broadened the orthodox concept of federalism by maintaining
that federalism was a means not only to achieve peace and security, but also to
guarantee the protection of the individual from the government. To insure that
protection in a democratic society even further, the Federalist introduced the
doctrine of judicial review.
G. DIRTZE, THE FEDERALIST. A CLASSIC ON FEDERALISM AND FREE GOVERNMENT 336-37
(1960).
216. C. BEARD, supra note 8, at vi. Pope McCorkle has argued that Beard consist-
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ard Hofstadter remained unconvinced with Beard's denial; Hof-
stadter stated that Beard had studied the Convention to show
that the Framers were concerned with private gain through ap-
preciation of their securities and to demonstrate the superiority
of economic and sociological realism over existing political
history.2
17
Beard's theory was then enlarged by V. L. Parrington, a
progressive historian, who observed that in actuality there were
two debates: (1) a private debate at the secret Constitutional
Convention that determined whether there should be any de-
mocracy at all, and, if so, how much; and (2) a subsequent public
debate that discussed the allegedly severe problems under the
Articles of Confederation, the need for checks on factions, and
the way a large territory could remain republican.21 Parrington
claimed that Hamilton led the aristocratic forces; to Hamilton,
democracy was nothing more than mob rule.219 Influenced by
Hume's cynicism and Hobbe's acceptance of the necessity of
power, Hamilton was a "High Tory" who supported moneyed in-
terests and a central government at the expense of the states.
Hamilton recommended a large national debt to ensure suffi-
cient taxation, which would require the public's continued hard
work. He also thought women and children should work. 220 Par-
rington's views typified the immediate reaction of professional
historians to Beard's work.
C. Beard's Work Reevaluated
Beard's book provoked some predictably primitive reac-
tions. The Marion Star headlined its story: "SCAVENGERS,
HYENA-LIKE, DESECRATE THE GRAVES OF THE DEAD
PATRIOTS WE REVERE. ' 2 1 The New York Bar Association
ently favored the pro-Constitution Federalists, including Hamilton, over the Jeffersoni-
ans, who also were economically motivated. Beard continued this pro-Federalist view
with a commitment to Progressive reforms. For example, in 1915 Beard praised Hamil-
ton as "among the great statesmen of all time." C. BEARD, THE ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF
JEFFERSONIAN DEMOCRACY 195 (1915), quoted in McCorkle, The Historian as Intellec-
tual: Charles Beard and the Constitution, 27 AM. J. LEGAL HIsT. 314, 327 (1984). Consis-
tent defense of property rights was one example of Beard's mix of Hamiltonian conserva-
tism with reform. Id. at 352.
217. R. HOFSTADTER, supra note 215, at 216-18.
218. 1 V.L. PARRINGTON, supra note 202, at 281.
219. Id. at 275.
220. Id. at 305-06.
221. R. HOFSTADTER, supra note 215, at 212.
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held Beard in contempt for failing to appear before a special
committee.222 And, although he acknowledged Beard's "pains-
taking investigation," Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote that
"[b]elittling arguments always have a force of their own, but
I believe that high-mindedness is not impossible to man.
'2 23
In 1928 attorney Charles Warren launched the first serious
counterattack to Beard's thesis.224 Although he considered Beard
an "able historian, ' 225 Warren believed that economics was not
as driving a force as the patriotic desire to save and strengthen
the country: "It was not the product of a class or of a section,
and no single influence led either to its inception or to its adop-
tion .... "226 Far more influential were such events as Shay's
Rebellion, Indian attacks in states such as Georgia, and the fight
in 1786 over Jay's Treaty, which relinquished British rights to
the Mississippi River. The Framers were afraid that the country
might divide into three or even four separate confederacies.
227
Moreover, the Constitution was designed to generate "an in-
crease of economic prosperity for all classes in the
community."
228
Warren found Beard's personalty/realty distinction simplis-
tic. Many farmers and middle class citizens, who held no securi-
ties, supported the Constitution; people from the same class
held different views on the Constitution.229 According to Warren,
the controversies at the Convention were not over the prohibi-
tion of paper money or taxation, but over the relative power of
big and small states and the relationship of the North and the
222. Id.
223. Id. at 212-13. Howard Laski replied to a letter he received from Holmes: "I
found the book dull, and the considerations a little thin, but I liked his honesty and his
serious attention to the documents. And it was a relief to get away from the revelation
granted by God to Alexander Hamilton early in 1787." Id. at 213. Gary Wills noted that
Laski had his own interpretation of The Federalist:
But the pluralists, led by Harold Laski, did not see in this a design to protect a
single minority. They assumed that Madison wanted to leave the field open for
other agencies to participate-voluntary, corporate, benevolent, or whatever.
Limited government promotes a wide range of social activities; its citizens do
not conceive social life as narrowly political in all aspects.
G. WILLs, EXPLAINING AMERIcA: THE FEDERALIST xvi (1981) (emphasis in original).
224. C. WARREN, supra note 139.
225. Id. at 550.
226. Id. at iii.
227. Id. at 30.
228. Id. at 54.
229. Id. at 69-81.
HeinOnline  -- 1985 BYU L. Rev. 106 1985
THE FEDERALIST PAPERS
South.2 30 Furthermore, Warren believed that the economic de-
bate was not as heated as Beard thought. The Anti-Federalists
rarely attacked the Constitution's financial provisions; they were
more concerned about the lack of a Bill of Rights and the possi-
bility of a takeover by a political aristocracy.23 '
Warren's daily study of the Convention also demonstrated
that major roles were played by Washington, Pinckney, Ran-
dolph, Madison, and Wilson. Hamilton, whose New York col-
leagues were Anti-Federalist, paid little attention to the pro-
ceedings, except when he made a long and passionate speech
favoring adoption of a monarchy government similar to the Brit-
ish system. According to Hamilton, "the British Government
was the best in the world and . . .he doubted much whether
anything short of it would do in America. 2 32 One of Hamilton's
best friends, Governor Morris, summarized Hamilton's initial re-
actions to the proposed Constitution:
[He] had little share in forming the Constitution; he believed
the republican government to be radically defective .... Ham-
ilton hated republican government, because he confounded it
with democratical government; and he detested the latter, be-
cause he believed it would end in despotism and be in the
meantime destructive to public morality.
33
Madison, the major leader at the Convention, was a con-
stant supporter of increased federal power. He supported such
proposals as a federal veto over state legislatures, national judi-
cial review of state legislation under the standard that the Court
"may adjudge such law to be void, if found contrary to the prin-
ciples of equity and justice, '23 4 and unequal representation in
the Senate. Madison seemed to agree with James Wilson's rhe-
torical question: "Can we forget for whom we are forming a Gov-
ernment? ... Is it for men, or for the imaginary beings called
States."235
230. Id. at 397.
231. Id. at 747-80.
232. Id. at 228.
233. Id. at 493-94 (quoting 2 DIARY AND LETTERS OF GOUVERNEUR MORRIS 523, 531
(1889)).
234. C. WARREN, supra note 139, at 311 (quoting 5 DocuMENTARY HISTORY OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 437 (1905)).
235. C. WARREN, supra note 139, at 256. Jefferson, who was in Paris, could not effec-
tively implement his views: "My general plan would be to make the States one as to
everything connected with foreign nations, and several as to everything purely domes-
tic." Id. at 382.
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Warren also found that Beard may have relied excessively
on The Federalist; the document did not have much impact on
the thinking of most of the Constitution's supporters or on the
ratification debates.236 As one Federalist politician observed
about Publius's letters: "He is certainly a judicious and inge-
nious writer, though not well calculated for the common peo-
ple. 2 7 Nevertheless, the document's prestige steadily increased
after ratification, while contemporaneous sources such as Pinck-
ney's Observations on the Plan of Government25 and Adam's A
Defence of the Constitutions of Government23 9 were virtually
forgotten.
In Politics and the Constitution24 ° William Crosskey stated
that subsequent deference to The Federalist was the result of
political efforts by the Jeffersonians, who claimed that the docu-
ment actively supported states' rights.241 According to Crosskey,
The Federalist was sophistically designed to understate the de-
gree of power given to the central government under the actual
wording of the Constitution. Later, when Hamilton and Madison
disagreed over the degree of national power under the Constitu-
tion, the Jeffersonians used this distortion to argue that the na-
tionalist Hamilton was being deceptive, while the states' rights
advocate Madison was being consistent. But Crosskey believed
that Madison consistently and deliberately confused the objects
236. In his biography of Hamilton, Forrest McDonald concluded that, although The
Federalist may have been admired for its rhetorical power, the New York conventioneers
were far more influenced by Virgnia's ratification and by the Federalists' threat that the
city of New York would secede from the state if it did not join the new Union. F. Mc-
DONALD, ALEXANDER HAMILTON: A BIOGRAPHY 114-15 (1979).
237. C. WARREN, supra note 139, at 767 (quoting 2 LiFE AND CORRESPONDENCE OF
JAMES IREDELL 219 (1858)).
238. C. PINCKNEY, OBSERVATIONS ON THE PLAN OF GOVERNMENT, submitted to the
Federal Convention in Philadelphia, on the 28th Day of May, 1787, delivered at different
times in the course of discussions.
239. J. ADAMS, A DEFENCE OF THE CONsTrruTIONS OF GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA (1797). V.L. Parrington did not forget Adam's influence on the for-
mation of the Constitution. See 1 V. PARRINGTON, supra note 202, at 310-20. Charles
Warren also discussed Adam's influence on the Convention. C. WARREN, supra note 139,
at 155-57, 815-18. Madison did not like Adam's book, while Jay did. Id. at 815.
240. W. CROSSKEY, PoLrrics AND THE CONSTrrUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES (1953). Crosskey's books received few favorable reviews. See, e.g., Corbin, Book
Review, 62 YALE L.J. 1137 (1953); Sharp, Book Review, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 439 (1954);
Sholley, Book Review, 49 Nw. U.L. REv. 114 (1954). Most critics questioned Crosskey's
methodology and assumptions. See, e.g., Brown, Book Review, 67 HARV. L. REv. 1439
(1954); Goebel, Book Review, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 450 (1954); Hart, Book Review, 67 HARV.
L. REV. 1456 (1954).
241. W. CROSSKEY, supra note 240, at 10-11.
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of the Constitution with its powers. Madison first was trying to
gain ratification in Anti-Federalist New York and later was op-
posing the Federalists' attempts to expand the national govern-
ment.242 Crosskey also observed that Madison's notes on the
Convention were unreliable, finding "that Madison's motives
were partly petty, personal, and political; and partly, as Madison
eventually came to view the matter, patriotic.
2 43
Despite periodic attacks that Beard's book was Marxist, his
views continued to prevail among the historians until the
1950's.244 Nevertheless, Beard apparently deemphasized eco-
nomic influences in his 1935 Introduction: "I have never been
able to discover all-pervading determinism in history."2 45 By
then Beard had been influenced by Philosopher Croce's relativ-
istic and aesthetic philosophy of history. For Beard, history had
taken on dreamlike qualities:
Beyond doubt scholars of competence can agree on many par-
ticular truths and large bodies of established facts. . . . The
historian is bound by his craft to recognize the nature and lim-
itations of the scientific method and to dispel the illusion that
it can produce a science of history embracing the fullness of
history, or any large phase, as past actuality. 4
6
Beard's retreat from economic determinism intrigued Henry
Commager. According to Commager, by the 1930's Beard consid-
ered history as an "act of faith"24 7 but did not know how to pro-
ceed from such relativism.
Beard's theories and data were carefully scrutinized in the
1950's. Historian Robert E. Brown wrote a scathing attack scru-
tinizing Beard's work page by page.248 Brown concluded that
there was no personalty/realty split: "If the conflict over ratifica-
tion had been between substantial personalty interests on the
one hand and small farmers and debtors on the other, there
would not have been a constitution. 2 49 Nor was there a coup,
since both the Continental Congress and the Articles of Confed-
242. Id. at 509 n.*.
243. Id. at 13.
244. C. BEARD, supra note 8, at ix.
245. Id. at xvi.
246. Beard, That Noble Dream, 40 AM. HIST. REV. 74, 76 (1935); see also Beard,
Written History as an Act of Faith, 39 AM. HIST. REV. 219 (1934); Smith, The Writing of
American History in America from 1884 to 1934, 40 AM. HIST. REv. 439 (1935).
247. H. COMMAGER, THE AMERICN MiND 314 (Bantam Matrix ed. 1970).
248. R. BROWN, CHARLES BEARD AND THE CONSTITUTMON (1956).
249. Id. at 199.
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eration had been started by conventions, and most of the white
males could vote on the new Constitution.2 50 Beard had exagger-
ated the degree of controversy; many people did not vote be-
cause they were indifferent.251 Beard had also misinterpreted
The Federalist; in Number 10 Madison stated that economics
was only the "most common and durable '252 of many potential
sources of faction: -
A zeal for different opinions concerning religion, concerning
government, and many other points, as well of speculation as
of practice; an attachment to different leaders ambitiously con-
tending for pre-eminence and power ... have, in turn, divided
mankind into parties, inflamed them with mutual animosity,
and rendered them much more disposed to vex and oppress
each other than to co-operate for their common good.
253
According to Brown, The Federalist was designed to appeal to
all property interests, not just to personalty interests. 2 4 Fur-
thermore, Beard never showed why Madison's Number 10 was
more important than the other eighty-four letters.25 5 Brown ap-
parently felt that unless Madison's Number 10 was the most im-
portant, Beard's economic analysis was hopelessly flawed.
Another historian, Forrest McDonald, concluded that Beard
correctly considered economics an important influence, but that
economic considerations varied from state to state. In states
such as Georgia, which was constantly threatened by Indians,
and New Jersey, which wanted to escape taxation by New York,
economic considerations helped unify the state conventions.
"[T]he great majority of their inhabitants saw that definite, im-
mediate, and substantial advantages would accrue to the states
as such, as well as to themselves as individuals."25
McDonald preferred to divide the conflict based on the rela-
tive strength of the states. Weak states wanted a national gov-
ernment while strong states were more resistant to a strong na-
tional government. 57 Unlike Beard, McDonald found that the
Constitutional Convention was not denominated by identity of
250. Id. at 138-41.
251. Id. at 198.
252. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 1, No. 10 at 79 (J. Madison).
253. Id.
254. R. BROWN, supra note 248, at 94.
255. Id. at 97.
256. F. McDONALD, WE THE PEOPLE 162 (1958).
257. Id. at 114-15.
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interests but rather by farmowners. 5 8 Indeed, even opponents to
the Constitution held personalty and supported hard money
policies.
We may never know if Beard was correct in claiming that
the Federalists held most of the public securities, or if McDon-
ald was correct in claiming that the securities were more evenly
distributed, since neither has made any effort "to establish own-
ership of securities as early as 1787. ' '259 The data is based on
property ownership in the 1790's, after the ratification of the
Constitution and after Hamilton's decision to fund the debt.
Nevertheless, creditors would obviously have benefited from a
strong government that could enforce taxation, even if more im-
portant political forces predominated.2 60
Jackson Turner Main defended Beard. Main conceded that
Beard improperly dramatized the role of personalty, but he did
not challenge Beard's central thesis that the Constitution re-
flected the economic interests of large property holders. The rat-
ification was a triumph of mercantilism over a diverse coalition
consisting of debtors, democrats, men afraid of central govern-
ment's broad and ambiguous powers, and men preferring the
status quo.261 Furthermore, the Federalists were aided by control
of the newspapers. 262 In New York the initial Anti-Federalist
majority disintegrated primarily because ten states had already
accepted the Constitution, thus forming a new Union, and be-
cause New York City had threatened to secede if New York did
not join the Union.263 The Federalist had little impact except as
258. Id. at 92.
259. E.J. FERGUSON, THE PowER OF THE PuRSE 339 (1961).
260. Id. at 341.
261. J.T. MAIN, THE ANTIFEDtHALISTS 280-81 (1961). Main concluded that Beard's
economic analysis was imperfect, but that Beard was on the correct path to understand-
ing why the Constitution was ratified: "In all parts of the country, therefore, the com-
mercial interest with its ramifications, including those who depended primarily and di-
rectly upon commerce, were Federal, and the 'non-navigating' folk were Antifederal." Id.
at 274.
Cecilia Kenyon had studied the Anti-Federalists and found them "Men of little
faith." The main issue, a political question, was the amount of power that should be
entrusted to inherently unreliable men. The Anti-Federalists were afraid of legislative
tyranny: "The Anti-Federalists were not latter-day democrats. Least of all were-they
majoritarians with respect to the national government.... Above all, they consistently
refused to accept legislative majorities as expressive either of justice or of the people's
will." Kenyon, Men of Little Faith: The Anti-Federalists on the Nature of Representa-
tive Government, 12 WM. & MARY Q. 3, 42 (3d series 1955).
262. J.T. MAIN, supra note 261, at 221.
263. Id. at 238-39. Hamilton did not significantly influence the New York Conven-
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a reference. According to Main, McDonald's point that many of
the Anti-Federalist leaders were wealthy did not refute Beard's
basic theme of economic conflict: "Popular parties typically de-
rive their leadership from men of large property .... Find-
ing McDonald's work filled with distortions, Main argued that
"men of means are made to appear quite the opposite. 2 6 5 Mc-
Donald replied that his study of property holdings of individual
delegates in states such as South Carolina had been distorted by
Main: "Mr. Main demonstrates that he is no better at arithmetic
than he is at reading.
'266
Lee Benson found the controversy about the property hold-
ings of delegates misleading. According to Benson, Beard used
the wrong technique to answer the question he was asking. Ben-
son argued that one cannot determine why voters voted as they
did by analyzing only the property holdings of their leaders at
the Convention. Instead, one must test the validity of the corre-
lation between voting behavior and the forms of property hold-
ings by correlating voting behavior with other variables (such as
ethnic background) to determine if other factors were actually
more important.267 Since such a study had not, and probably
could not have been done, Beard's thesis was neither proven nor
disproven.
An interesting verification of Benson's methodological point
was provided by Stanley Elkins and Eric McKitrick, who wrote
that the debate over the Constitution can best be understood as
a generational conflict.6 5 Older men feared any change that
might create a tyranny similar to the British Government, while
younger Constitutionalists wanted to participate in a growing so-
ciety. Elkins and McKitrick reviewed Forrest McDonald's list of
Federalist and Anti-Federalist leaders and found that the Feder-
alists were, on the average, ten to twelve years younger than the
tion; his promonarchy speech made him vulnerable. Id. at 238.
264. Main, Charles A. Beard and the Constitution: A Critical Review of Forrest
McDonald's We the People, 17 WM. & MARY Q. 86, 94 (3d series 1960).
265. Id. at 90.
266. McDonald, Forrest McDonald's Rebuttal, 17 WM. & MARY Q. 102, 107 (3d se-
ries 1960). The debate between Main and McDonald is peppered with such biting at-
tacks as: "Similarly, I am unhappy with Mr. Main's practice of building logical conclu-
sions upon self-contradictory assumptions, and changing his assumptions to suit his
convenience." Id. at 103.
267. L. BENSON, supra note 206, at 151-74.
268. Elkins & McKitrick, The Founding Fathers: Young Men of the Revolution, 76
POL. SCL Q. 181 (1961).
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Anti-Federalists. 269 "[T]he Young Men of the Revolution might
at last imagine, after a dozen years of anxiety, that their Revolu-
tion had been a success. 2 70 Benson would probably reply that
this thesis should be tested by correlating age differentials to
voting behavior and then by contrasting the correlation of prop-
erty holdings and voting behavior. Only then could one deter-
mine which thesis better explained the creation and ratification
of the Constitution.
When Richard Hofstadter reviewed this evolving body of
literature, he concluded that the constitutional debate could
best be described as a struggle between "divided state elites.
27 1
Although there was an aristocratic tone to the Constitution and
the Convention, the document was relatively democratic, partic-
ularly when compared to existing state or European constitu-
tions.272 But since both sides were not very democratic and
agreed on many issues such as hard money, Beard erred in char-
acterizing the conflict as a rich-poor struggle.27 s
Even if one turns from theories that attempt to explain ac-
ceptance of the Constitution to more broadly based histories of
the era, we find controversy. Merrill Jensen wrote in The New
Nation7 4 that the economy and society were not in as hopeless a
condition as Fiske and Hamilton had stated: "The 'critical pe-
riod' idea was the result of an uncritical acceptance of the argu-
ments of the victorious party in a long political battle . -.275
Jensen concluded that many of the Anti-Federalists were not
narrow and provincial:
[T]he best of them agreed that the central government needed
more power, but they wanted that power given so as not to
alter the basic character of the Articles of Confederation. Here
is where they were in fundamental disagreement with the na-
269. Id. at 203. Main rejects this thesis, which Charles Warren first implied in his
book. C. WARREN, supra note 139, at 759. Main studied each of the ratifying Conven-
tions: "All told, the Federalists were about two years younger than their antagonists. It is
hard to see how this could have made any difference." J.T. MAIN, supra note 261, at 259.
Once again one sees how historical conclusions can vary greatly depending upon the
group chosen for study.
270. Elkins & McKitrick, supra note 268, at 216 (emphasis in original).
271. R. HOFSTADTER, supra note 215, at 240.
272. Id. at 268-69.
273. Id. at 238-39.
274. M. JENSEN, THE NEW NATION (1950),
275. Id. at 422.
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tionalists who wanted to remove the central government from
the control of the state legislatures.
2 7
Unfortunately, present historical awareness remains incom-
plete because, as Robert Shalhope observed, there are no excel-
lent social histories of the era to give us an impression of the
lives of the average citizens. 7
D. Use of Biographies
In addition to studying historians' various theories of the
proper meanings to attach to The Federalist and the Constitu-
tion, one can also learn about the Framers' intentions by reading
their biographies. This technique forces one to consider the diffi-
cult problems of changing attitudes and political posturing. For
example, are Hamilton's views of the Constitution best captured
in his 1783 initial proposal for a strong central government, his
speech at the Convention favoring monarchy, his arguments in
The Federalist, his actions as Secretary of the Treasury under
Washington, or his final despairing efforts to "prop the frail and
worthless fabric"?
278
Furthermore, just as monographs on constitutional motiva-
tions arguably suffered from poor methodology, unreliable data,
and questionable inferences, biographies are frequently generous
to their subjects. For instance, neither Broadus Mitchell nor
Clinton Rossiter mentioned that New York City's threat of se-
cession pressured many of the Anti-Federalists to switch sides.
Instead, both biographers preferred to emphasize Hamilton's
brilliant parliamentary skills as a major reason for the Federal-
ists' victory in New York. Despite analytical weaknesses in rely-
ing on biographies of the Framers, a justice or a lawyer can learn
276. Id. at 424-25. In his study of public finance from 1776 to 1790, James Ferguson
showed that nationalists found the war debt vital to their cause: "In the years after the
war, the task of paying the debt was the chief function of a central government which
otherwise lacked compelling reasons for existence." E.J. FEROUSON, supra note 259, at
335. Meeting this severe need required a fundamental change in political perspective; no
longer would liberty be equated with popular control over taxation: "Individual rights
and local privileges were no longer regarded as standing against the authority of the
government; they were to be advanced by soliciting its aid and patronage." Id. at 334.
277. Shalhope, Douglass Adair and the Historiography of Republicanism, cited in
D. ADAIR, supra note 190, at xxxiv. Gordon Wood wrote a fascinating study of the evolu-
tion of American political theory during this era. See G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE
AMERICAN REPUBLIc 1776-1787 (1969).
278. B. MITCHELL, supra note 24, at 34.
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a great deal about the Framers' intention by undertaking such a
study.
1. Hamilton's consistent rationalism
Hamilton always supported the national government and
individual rights over the "artificial beings" called states.27 9 His
early experiences reinforced his beliefs in a strong government.
And as Washington's chief aide-de-camp for four years, he wit-
nessed the need for and the use of emergency war powers. In
1778 Hamilton complained to George Clinton about the decline
in the quality of congressional representatives, saying that the
best men, out of "local attachment, falsely operating," had re-
turned to state government. According to Hamilton, the Union
would be destroyed if this "pernicious mistake" were not cor-
rected.2 0 He later oversaw the federal collection of taxes in New
York and became frustrated when Rhode Island's veto destroyed
the effort to create a national duty impost."' While a member of
the feeble Continental Congress in 1783, Hamilton proposed
radical changes to the Articles of Confederation;28 2 his draft first
presented many of the powers contained in the future Constitu-
tion. He also helped to start the Bank of New York in 1784.
When the New York Legislature debated the future status of
Vermont, then a rebellious part of New York, Hamilton claimed
that the New York Constitution's silence meant that the state
had the implied power to relinquish a section of itself. As his
biographer Broadus Mitchell put it, "[p]olicy dictated what the
Constitution permitted. 28 3 Hamilton supported Vermont's inde-
pendence as long as Vermont joined the Union. Indeed, Hamil-
ton's minimal participation in the Constitutional Convention
may have partially been a result of his indifference to the form
of national government organization so long as it arrogated as
much power as possible from the states.284
Although both Broadus Mitchell and Clinton Rossiter em-
phasized The Federalist's historical significance, Clinton Ros-
279. C. RossrrFA supra note 6, at 47.
280. F. McDONALD, supra note 236, at 19. McDonald elaborated: "That line of
thinking-a belief that attachment to the interests of states, rather than to the nation,
would undermine the American cause-would grow in Hamilton's mind." Id.
281. B. MrrcHELL, supra note 24, at 284-85.
282. Id. at 323.
283. Id. at 376.
284. F. McDONALD, supra note 236, at 96.
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siter concluded, after surveying additional publications of The
Federalist: "It should be plain to see that the letters of Publius
were not snapped up eagerly by editors in other parts of the
country [outside New York state], that those who set out to re-
print the series grew weary and wary in fairly short order
... '2l5 Rossiter claimed that the The Federalist probably did
not influence the first eight states that ratified the Constitution,
for "[t]he chief usefulness of The Federalist in 1787-1789 was as
a kind of debater's handbook in Virginia and New York. Fifty-
two copies of the collected edition were rushed to Richmond at
Hamilton's direction and used by advocates of the Constitution
in the climactic debate over ratification . 286
Hamilton initially did not think The Federalist was one of
his best works, perhaps because it did not express his full views,
as Broadus Mitchell explained:
The constitutional contest was a sham battle; victory or defeat
would come on a different field .... The mental construct was
preliminary only....
This was Hamilton's Federalist within The Federal-
ist .... But his secret thoughts, betrayed now and then in
The Federalist papers, were what soon animated his role in the
Treasury.
2 7
And Hamilton's activities in the Treasury were daz-
zling-assuming and funding the Revolutionary debts, levying
federal taxes, creating a viable hard currency, starting the Bank
of the United States, administering the new agency, and con-
stantly advising Washington to increase executive power.
When Hamilton defended the constitutionality of a national
bank in his 1791 memorandum to Washington, he argued that
there was "no parsimony of power" in Article I, section 8.288
With a few exceptions, such as the bill of attainder prohibition,
Congress apparently had the "power to pass all laws whatso-
ever." 28 9 Thus, according to Hamilton, the central government
285. C. ROSSITER, supra note 6, at 55 n.16 (citing BLACK, THE PROPOSED AMENDMENT
OF ARTICLE V: A THREATENED DISASTER 957 (1963)).
286. Id. at 56.
287. B. MITCHELL, supra note 24, at 424-25.
288. C. RossrrER, supra note 6, at 208. Hamilton's opinion on the constitutionality
of the bank could have been used far more often by those Justices wishing to expand
national powers at the expense of the states: "It is not denied that there are implied, as
well as express powers, and that the former are as effectually delegated as the latter." 3
THE WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 16, at 449 (emphasis in original).
289. C. RossrrER, supra note 6, at 208.
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must be strong: "A weak and embarrassed government never
fails to be unpopular. It attaches to itself the disrespect incident
to weakness, and, unable to promote the public happiness, its
impotencies are its crimes.
' 29
0
2. Madison's changing views
Irving Brant's biography of Madison revealed how
Madison's early career made him nationalistic. Madison believed
the currency collapse in 1781 was caused by the states.291
Madison criticized Jay's 1786 treaty defending western territo-
ries and the right to use the Mississippi River. In addition
Madison supported the use of public monies to sustain state
banks.2  Madison was a member of a Continental Congress that
broadly interpreted the general welfare provision in the Articles
of Confederation by authorizing such activities as a continental
ferry, government-owned tanyards, a private printing office, and
the education of Indian children at Dartmouth and Princeton.9 3
However, in 1784 Madison helped to defeat bills that would
have required a general tax to support religion and the episcopal
clergy.
294
Thus, when Madison came to the Constitutional Convention
to help draft the Constitution, he was firmly committed to a lim-
ited, but supreme, national government. His ally Rufus King
wrote to a mutual friend:
Mr. Madison of Virginia has been here for some time past
.... He will attend the convention. He does not discover or
propose any other plan than that of investing Congress with
full powers for the regulation of commerce foreign and domes-
tic. But this power will run deep into the authorities of the
individual states, and can never be well exercised without a
federal judiciary. The reform must necessarily be extensive. 2 5
When Madison wrote his letters in The Federalist, he deter-
mined the best structure for the new government by consulting
290. Id. at 172 (quoting 9 THE WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 16, at
31).
291. I. BRANT, JAMES MADISON: THE NATIONALIST 1780-1787, at 28 (1948).
292. Id. at 129.
293. Id. Rhode Island's veto of the tax adversely affected Madison. While inflation
was virulent, "Madison collected not one penny of salary during his first three years in
Congress." Id. at 209-10.
294. Id. at 322.
295. Id. at 383.
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his studies of ancient republics and his own notes on the
Constitution.
Madison was unsure of the appropriate relationship be-
tween Congress and the Supreme Court; however, he consist-
ently supported judicial review of state actions and opposed
state rights to secede after joining the new government.29
Madison, of course, later became a champion of states' rights,
revising his notes to diminish his earlier nationalistic
perspectives.
2 97
Madison believed that the major tension at the Convention
existed between the North and the South. However, the most
heated debates resulted from the small states' attempts to take
over the new government in order to control distribution of the
western lands.9 8 Committed to a strong national government
that could even "absorb the state governments," Madison
helped to prevent the Convention's dissolution. However, several
of his proposals were defeated: a national veto of all state laws
that the national legislature believed contravened the Articles of
Union,299 and a presidential term lasting for either seven years
or as long as the President acted in good behavior.0
Brant agreed with Beard that Madison thought economics
was the primary source of faction. However, Madison did not
believe in the supremacy of property. Not only did Madison be-
lieve that certain personal rights, such as voting rights, were
more important than property rights, but he also concluded that
government had a duty to ensure that certain forms of property
did not dominate other forms of property. Indeed, the govern-
ment was obligated to prevent excessive disparity in wealth and
oppression of the poor by the rich.301 These beliefs were proba-
bly the source of Madison's bitter conflicts with Hamilton; these
conflicts began when Hamilton, as Secretary of the Treasury,
paid off the holders of government securities in full. Madison
believed that the original holders should only receive the differ-
ence between the existing market value and the face value of the
notes.302 By 1791 Hamilton concluded "that Mr. Madison, coop-
296. L BRANT, supra note 26, at 110-11.
297. Id. at 86, 89.
298. Id. at 50-52.
299. C. WARREN, supra note 139, at 164-71.
300. I. BRANT, supra note 26, at 105-06.
301. Id. at 119, 174-75.
302. Id. at 294.
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erating with Mr. Jefferson, is at the head of a faction decidedly
hostile to me and my administration; and actuated by views in
my judgment subversive of the principles of good government
and dangerous to the union, peace and happiness of the
country.
'30 3
Obviously, the views of the Framers cannot be rigidly cate-
gorized. The Court should study biographies to determine the
views of these men and to determine how they would have inter-
preted the Constitution in particular situations. Although one
may conclude that Hamilton and Madison might have inter-
preted the Constitution differently at various times in their ca-
reers, one would gain insight into not only what they believed at
the time of ratification, but also into deeper views on the proper
relationship between the individual and the state.
E. The Federalist as Political Theory
An additional technique to determine the Framers' motives
and intent is to analyze their works (such as The Federalist) for
its intellectual content and political theory. One may discover
that these great thinkers articulated premises now readily as-
sumed or that some of their views now seem outdated. Douglass
Adair challenged Beard's economic determinism by demonstrat-
ing that the Framers, particularly Madison, were motivated by
ideas as well as by money. Madison held sincere moral beliefs,
and made important contributions to political science (particu-
larly in The Federalist). Furthermore, any attempt to under-
stand the motives and intent of the Framers must include an
awareness of the European writers who influenced the Founding
Fathers; complete research must therefore include history that
preceded the Revolution.
Adair found that the Scottish Enlightenment inspired
Madison; the Scots used "reason to discover the immutable laws
of human nature."'3 0' The writers of the Scottish Enlightenment
supported a democratic form of government. On the other hand,
Hamilton believed in a system of class government but could not
303. Id. at 351. Brant stated that Hamilton's jealousy of Jefferson resulted from
their competition for the presidency. Even though he altered one of Jefferson's official
letters to make Jefferson appear a swindler, Hamilton felt no guilt in insinuating that
Madison may have fabricated letters showing that Jefferson had always supported the
Constitution. Id. at 361-63.
304. D. ADAm, James Madison, in FAME AND THE FOUNDING FATHERS 128 (1974).
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convince the Constitutional Convention to adopt a system simi-
lar to the British constitutional monarchy.
Since Hamilton's political theory was rejected, and the pro-
posal to establish a republic was accepted, the only admissible
issue in the later ratification struggle was how to have a strong
republic.30 5 According to Adair, The Federalist's brilliance was
not in creating a new set of premises upon which to build a gov-
ernment, but rather in designing a working system based upon
accepted values. Hamilton adopted Madison's argument that a
large republican state was actually stronger than a smaller re-
publican state. Hamilton, however, did not strongly believe in
the Constitution he was defending or in the arguments made in
its defense. He wanted to change the Constitution and even pro-
posed a legislative coup d'etat in 1798 while at the peak of his
power.1
0 6
Madison's government allowed the people direct access only
through the House and indirect influence through the other
branches. This was not a pure mixed government with distinct
powers allocated to a monarchy, an aristocracy, and a majority
through democracy, such as had been proposed by Hamilton and
Adams, but rather a quasi-mixed government, with a bias to-
ward democracy.3 0 7 Beard and the other Progressives thus erred
in claiming that the Constitution was a totally reactionary, an-
tidemocratic system3 °8 Indeed, Adair wrote that the Framers'
commitment to fame motivated many of them to transcend their
immediate self-interest. Aware that they were creating the first
republican government, they wanted to be remembered for their
deeds. The economic theorists, from Beard to McDonald, relied
upon an overly restrictive definition of self-interest.30 9
The Federalist's sophisticated political theory and its explo-
ration into human behavior also intrigued political scientist
Robert Dahl. Dahl found Madison's terminology hopelessly am-
biguous, questioning what Madison meant by "natural rights"
305. See D. ADAIR, The Federalist Papers, in FAME AND THE FOUNDING FATHERS 254
(1974).
306. D. ADAIR, Was Alexander Hamilton a Christian Statesman?, in FAME AND THE
FOUNDING FATHERS 152 (1974).
307. D. ADAIR, "Experience Must Be Our Only Guide": History, Democratic The-
ory, and the United States Constitution, in FAME AND THE FOUNDING FATHERS 123
(1974).
308. D. ADAIR, The Tenth Federalist Revisited, in FAME AND THE FOUNDING FATHERS
81-92 (1974).
309. D. ADAIR, supra note 190, at 4.
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and "majority tyranny." 310 Because Madison expressed fears
concerning majorities oppressing minorities abstractly, virtually
any minority could claim to be Madisonian when obstructing a
majority decision.3 11 Since Madison's original terms were so
vague, his solutions of government structure did not necessarily
provide the compromise sought between the competing goals of
providing an egalitarian voting republic and protecting certain
minority rights.
Gary Wills sought to rehabilitate Madison from Dahl's cri-
tique by showing that Madison never expected structural re-
forms to be adequate protection from tyranny: "But it is clear
from the text that Madison expected a great deal from the peo-
ple, from central power, and from their rulers." 312 And although
Madison was a poor prophet,3 13 his predictions reflected the op-
timism of his era of the American Enlightenment. Moreover, un-
anticipated changes demonstrate how the Constitution can toler-
ate alterations that the authors of The Federalist probably
would have opposed; The Federalist cannot be seen as a more
complete version of the Constitution.3 14
David Epstein revealed the political assumptions behind
The Federalist's argument that a large republican government
can best advance the goals of justice (individual rights) and of
the public good (aggregate interests).3 15 Republican structures,
according to Epstein, appeal to and moderate the underlying po-
litical psychology of man: a mixture of passion, interest, ambi-
310. R. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 7, 30 (1956).
311. Id. at 30.
312. G. WILLS, supra note 223, at 265.
313. Madison failed to foresee how the Constitution would evolve and tolerate party
politics, a strong executive, and the expansion of direct democracy, particularly in the
Senate.
314. G. Wills, supra note 223, at 267. Indeed, the authors of The Federalist ex-
pressed some of their reservations about the new Constitution. See C. RoSSrrER, supra
note 6, at 282 n.101.
315. D. EPSTEIN, supra note 170, at 83, 102, 108. The primary goal of government is
safety because without security neither justice nor the public good are achievable. Id. at
163.
Epstein's claim that he presented distinctions concerning in The Federalist that
were insufficiently analyzed by previous scholars is somewhat difficult to evaluate since
he rarely made specific references. He mentioned Adair twice, Mason four times, Beard
once and never discussed Dahl or Wills. When he observed that Number 10 does not
even endorse federalism but actually contains an "implicit indictment of the states," we
find in a footnote that this observation was first made by Mason. Id. at 213 n.108 and
accompanying text.
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tion, honor, and patriotism.3 16 The desire for a large republican
government was premised on a mixed view of mankind.
V. HISTORIOGRAPHY OF THE MODERN COURT
Now we can compare the Supreme Court's use of The Fed-
eralist papers in constitutional adjudication with the wealth of
information provided by historians' debates. Such a comparison
will dramatize the Court's peculiar historiography, a historical
methodology virtually unchanged since the nineteenth century.
The Court has referred to Beard's Economic Interpretation
only three times. In Home Building & Loan Association v.
Blaisdel1317 Justice Sutherland cynically utilized Beard's thesis
that the Constitution was a conservative document; Sutherland
argued that the Framers wanted to protect property and would
have opposed the decision upholding a statutory mortgage mora-
torium.3 1 Justice Powell referred to Beard's book in Reeves, Inc.
v. Stake31 to show that the Annapolis Convention, called before
the Constitutional Convention, had failed.3 20 Justice Powell also
emphasized Hamilton's Federalist vision of a broad federal com-
merce clause but made no further reference to Beard. Finally, in
Bell v. Maryland3 21 Justice Douglas maintained that any con-
ception of private property that could exclude Negroes from
business would give impetus to Beard's theory that the Consti-
tution was "an economic document drawn with superb skill by
men whose property interests were immediately at stake.
322
Virtually all of Beard's critics have been ignored,323 al-
though the Court has referred to several pro-Beardian scholars'
works. However, cases including pro-Beardian references did not
316. D. EPSTEIN, supra note 170. Epstein explained the difference between these five
motives: (a) passion is more volatile, based upon such emotional faces as religious differ-
ences, id. at 71; (b) interest refers to the relatively steady urge to advance economically,
id. at 75-76; (c) ambition is the desire to have power, id. at 185; (d) honor is the legiti-
mate wish to control one's destiny, id. at 119; and (e) patriotism is the desire to see the
country flourish, id. at 94-95.
317. 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
318. Id. at 458 n.3, 463-64 (Sutherland, J., dissenting).
319. 447 U.S. 429 (1980).
320. Id. at 447 (Powell, J., dissenting).
321. 378 U.S. 226 (1964).
322. Id. at 253 (Douglas, J., concurring).
323. The Court has never resorted to Lee Benson, Robert E. Brown, James Fergu-
son, Alpheus Mason, Broadus Mitchell, William Crosskey, Benjamin Wright, Jackson
Turner Main, Cecilia Kenyon, Forrest McDonald, John Roche, Stanley Elkins, Merrill
Jensen, Douglass Adair, Gottfried Dertz, or Gary Wills.
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consider The Federalist. For example, Irving Brant's biogra-
phies of Madison have been cited eleven times.3 24 Four of Henry
Commager's works were considered in eleven cases 2 5 The Court
also made two citations to Dahl's A Preface to Democratic The-
ory,326 and, V.L. Parrington was acknowledged in three cases. 27
Naturally, other post-Beardian historical works have been
included in cases referring to The Federalist, but the justices
did not consult those works to better understand The Federal-
ist. Examples are Bailyn's Ideological Origins of the American
Revolution,328 Hofstadter's The Age of Reform, 29 Clinton Ros-
siter's Constitutional Dictatorship,330 The Grand Convention,31
Duniway's Freedom of the Press in Massachusetts,3 2 and Ran-
dall's Constitutional Problems Under Lincoln.
3 3 3
The Court has continued its practice of making multiple ci-
tations to the Federalist historians of the nineteenth century to
324. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 34 n.11 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting);
Knapp v. Schweitzer, 357 U.S. 371, 377 n.3 (1958); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420,
438 n.14 (1961); Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 271 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissent-
ing); International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 778 n.4 (1961) (Douglas,
J., concurring); School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 237 n.6
(1963) (Brennan, J., concurring); City of Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808, 840 n.2
(1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Holmes v. United States, 391 U.S. 936, 939 (1968)
(Douglas, J., dissenting); Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413
U.S. 756, 771 n.28 (1973); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 235 n.31 (1977);
First Nat'l Bank v. Belloti, 435 U.S. 765, 794 n.34 (1978).
325. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 13 n.14 (1947); American Fed'n of Labor
v. American Sash & Door Co., 335 U.S. 538, 556 n.16 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring);
United States v. UAW-CIO, 352 U.S. 567, 570 (1957); Federal Power Comm'n v. Tusca-
rora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 140 n.22 (1960) (Black, J., dissenting); Monroe v. Pape,
365 U.S. 167, 225 n.35 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S.
226, 247 n.3 (1964) (Douglas, J., concurring); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409,
426 n.34 (1968); Environmental Protection Agency v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 105 (1973)
(Douglas, J., dissenting); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 35 n.16 (1973); DeFunis v.
Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 334 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc.,
436 U.S. 307, 311 n.5 (1978).
326. Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713, 748 n.10 (1964) (Stewart,
J., dissenting); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 299 n.38 (1978).
327. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 427 n.9 (1962); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392
U.S. 409, 473 n.54 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 35 n.6
(1973).
328. Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 415 n.8 (1979); Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228,
244 n.18 (1982).
329. Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 431 n.1 (1980).
330. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 651 n.20 (1952).
331. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 173 n.3 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
332. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 519 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
333. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 210-11 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
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understand better The Federalist papers. The Federalist was
cited in twenty-seven of the seventy-seven cases in which jus-
tices referred to Story's Commentaries. Kent's Commentaries
were cited thirty-eight times and The Federalist was included in
six of those cases. The Court mentioned Rawle's works four
times using The Federalist in two of those four opinions. Fiske's
The Critical Period in American History appeared in four cases,
including one case that also discussed The Federalist. Cooley's
Constitutional Limitations was referred to in forty-three cases,
seven of which included The Federalist. And in four of the six
cases that cited Curtis' work, The Federalist was also used.
334
Of course, several primary sources have been cited along
with The Federalist. Elliot's Debates were cited fifty-eight
times; in twenty-five of those cases, The Federalist was also con-
sidered. Farrand's Records were cited sixty-two times, including
forty times with The Federalist. Hamilton's Works appeared in
eight cases, five with The Federalist. The Court also considered
Madison's papers three times, two times with The Federalist.
3 35
Charles Warren has been the only relevant post-Beardian
scholar to be frequently cited for an understanding of The Fed-
eralist and the Constitution's meaning. In seven of eighteen
cases citing Warren's The Supreme Court in United States His-
tory, The Federalist was included. The Court also referred to
The Making of the Constitution thirteen times, invoking The
Federalist ten of those times. In none of these citations, how-
ever, did the Court consider Warren's discussion of Beard or of
The Federalist itself.
3 36
Fortunately, justices were sometimes aware of historical
controversies. In Wesberry v. Sanders337 Justice Black stated in
a footnote that controversy existed over the authorship of cer-
tain papers in The Federalist.38 In Powell v. McCormack339
Chief Justice Warren relied heavily on Charles Warren's analysis
334. The cases that cite Story's Commentaries, Kent's Commentaries, Rawle's
works, Fiske's The Critical Period in American History and Cooley's Constitutional
Limitations and Curtis' work along with The Federalist are listed in Appendix A.
335. The cases that cite Elliot's Debates, Farrand's Records, Hamilton's Works and
Madison's papers along with The Federalist are listed in Appendix A.
336. The cases that cite Warren's The Supreme Court in United States History and
Warren's The Making of the Constitution along with The Federalist are listed in Ap-
pendix A.
337. 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
338. Id. at 15 n.40.
339. 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
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of the Constitutional Convention to prove that Congress had
limited powers in regulating its own membership.3 0 In a foot-
note the Chief Justice cited Farrand and Story, who agreed with
Charles Warren's interpretation that "[s]uch action would seem
to make it clear that the Convention did not intend to grant to a
single branch of Congress ... the right to establish any qualifi-
cations for its members, other than those qualifications estab-
lished by the Constitution itself. '341 The Chief Justice also
noted Professor Chafee's position that Warren's theory was "the
soundest policy, '342 although Chafee had argued the theory was
unsupported by congressional precedent.
VI. CONCLUSION
Although the Court has not taken advantage of the abun-
dant research and theories of post-Beardian scholars,343 one
wonders whether use of such information would have altered the
outcome of any of the Court decisions. 44 A legal realist such as
tenBroek may conclude that since the Court uses history pri-
marily for persuasive or rhetorical purposes, a deeper historical
survey would only produce more conflicting and ambiguous data
to be manipulated by justices who still would decide cases by
relying primarily on their own values.
340. Id. at 532-41.
341. Id. at 536-37 n.69 (quoting C. WARREN, supra note 139, at 421).
342. 395 U.S. at 537 n.69.
343. I would like to bury two caveats in this footnote. First, the Supreme Court's
constitutional history has not been as superficial as its history of The Federalist, even
though the Court's failure to consider Beardian issues demonstrates a lack of depth in
the historical analysis of both documents. For as this article has shown, the Court has
frequently used other primary sources to define the constitutional language. There have
been discussions of the Framers' actions after the Constitution. For instance, in Equal
Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226 (1983), Justice Powell
noted in dissent that Madison opposed the Alien and Sedition Act based on a theory of
limited delegation of state powers to the federal government. Id. at 271-72 (Powell, J.,
dissenting). Such history has resulted in indirect analysis of The Federalist passages.
Second, the Court's emphasis on early historians can partially be explained by the
nature of judicial inquiry. The Court usually has been trying to interpret one clause; the
early historians, especially Story, studied the Constitution line by line. Later historians,
frequently engaging in broader studies, often did not provide this focused perspective.
Nevertheless, my basic thesis remains valid: the Court has never scrutinized The Feder-
alist itself with any intensity.
344. A thorough normative evaluation of the Court's peculiar history would necessi-
tate writing a section that would dwarf the empirical data already presented. One would
first have to explain what the Court ought and ought not to be attempting to verify
historically. A model of good history would have to be presented to contrast it with the
Court's techniques.
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A legal formalist 45 may not concede that the Court adjudi-
cates based on the values of individual justices; he could say the
Court has appropriately restricted its analysis to the plain
meaning of language in extrinsic aids to determine the original
intentions of the Framers. Accordingly, the Court has properly
excluded most historical works that emphasize motivation. Fur-
ther, he may assert that The Federalist has been appropriately
influential since it discusses in depth many of the Constitution's
most important sections.
Some members of the critical legal studies movement may
conclude that the motives for the Court's limited historical in-
quiry have been to glorify the Constitution and its Framers and
to obfuscate the economic and political forces that helped create
the Constitution. The justices believed that merely citing Hamil-
ton, Madison, and The Federalist instilled sufficient awe to pre-
clude further historical analysis. The Court's continued prefer-
ence for the nineteenth century Federalist historians over the
post-Beardian scholars exemplified the Court's attempts to di-
vorce law from politics by emphasizing doctrine at the expense
of political motives, economic factors, and hidden intentions.
Such an indictment is similar to Beard's implied thesis that
since many of the Constitutional delegates held depreciated gov-
ernmental debts, they created the Constitution to profit from
appreciation in those securities. Beard later explicitly rejected
any such theory; he believed that the Framers' motives, though
varied, were primarily patriotic. Similarly, the justices' mode of
historical analysis has not been motivated solely by ignorance or
deceit. I am wary of inferring purely venal motives from a lim-
ited set of facts applying to many people over a long period of
history. For instance, no one could accuse Justice Holmes, who
only cited The Federalist once, of being hostile to historical in-
quiry. Some justices may agree with Holmes that history plays a
minor role in constitutional adjudication, or they may have been
345. Grant Gilmore has humorously described the periodic dominance of legal
formalism:
All generalizations are oversimplifications. It is not true that, during a given
fifty-year period, all the lawyers and all the judges are lighthearted innovators,
joyful anarchists, and adepts of Llewellyn's Grand Style-only to be converted
en masse during the next fifty-year period to formalism or conceptualism.
There are formalists during innovative periods and innovators during formalis-
tic periods ....
G. GILMORE, THE AGES OF AmERcAN LAW 16 (1977). Gilmore's arch-villian formalist was
C. Langdell, Harvard Law School's creator of the case method. Id. at 42-43.
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sincerely engaging in an American form of hagiolatry, agreeing
with the historian Clinton Rossiter that The Federalist is one of
American's "sacred texts. ' 346 But whatever their motivations,
virtually all the justices have engaged in the juristic history con-
demned by Beard.
Even assuming history should not be a major source of con-
stitutional guidance, a close historical inquiry challenges the va-
lidity of many substantive decisions. If Alexander Hamilton and
to a lesser degree, James Madison, were told that the Constitu-
tion strongly protected civil rights but no longer gave much pro-
tection to property rights, they would probably claim that their
intentions had been subverted. The Constitution was clearly
designed to protect property rights from majority tyranny; 47 to
strip the Constitution of its ability to vigorously protect prop-
erty rights threatens the original concept of the Constitution.
Additionally, if Hamilton and Madison were told that some jus-
tices have interpreted The Federalist to support an expansion of
state power under the tenth amendment, they would probably
be equally surprised. Their actions throughout the ratification
struggle indicated a preference for federal government at the ex-
pense of the "artificial beings" called states.
Assuming these two projections are justifiable, or correct, a
contemporary justice faces a dilemma since history appears to
conflict with existing constitutional theories. If, in the above two
situations, a justice were to defer to historical views such as
Hamilton's and Madison's, he or she may be forced to reject the
doctrines established in footnote four of Carolene Products3 48
and in National League of Cities v. Usery3 49 Conversely, a jus-
tice's acceptance of Carolene Products' constitutional hierarchy
of values-placing personal liberties above property
rights-forces the justice to partially reject Madison's theories of
the Constitution.
346. C. RossrrER, supra note 6, at 52.
347. "National power was for Hamilton by no means an end in itself, but was a mere
means for securing the happiness of the individual, of which the protection of property
constituted a prominent part." G. DmTZE, supra note 215, at 341. Dietze's interpretation
of The Federalist probably would have resurrected substantive due process in cases in-
volving economic rights.
348. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). For a
vigorous application and extension of this footnote, see J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST
75-77 (1980).
349. 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Auth., 105 S. Ct. 1005 (1985)).
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Why, then, do we even continue to study and learn about
these men's views and lives in analyzing the Constitution and
the arguments made in its defense? Many reasons exist aside
from the direct impact history should have on specific legal
cases. Evaluating The Federalist's origins and its arguments
forces us to reconsider our own basic values. The Federalist's
authors astutely commented on issues obviously relevant to con-
stitutional interpretation; to ignore their arguments would be
provincial. Additionally, we can understand how our own views
are formed by intellectually and historically studying their ori-
gins,350 and can appreciate why and how changes in ideas have
taken place and how we are bound by history. We must be care-
ful not to dismiss the past. Complete disregard for the past
means that lawyers cannot significantly influence the future, and
the very process of law is threatened. By learning more about
Hamilton and Madison and by discovering their motivations, we
can understand their way of thinking. As Albert Furtwangler re-
cently observed, The Federalist's greatest value may lie in its
civil tone.3 51 With this perspective, we may be able to continue
Hamilton and Madison's tradition of thoughtfully trying to pro-
tect both society and the individual.5 2
350. Oliver Wendell Holmes was well versed in legal history, but wrote that "the
present has a right to govern itself so far as it can." O.W. HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL
PAPERS 139 (1920). Even without being consciously incorporated into the law, history
inevitably binds us: "The past gives us our vocabulary and fixes the limits of our imagi-
nation .... ." Id. Thus, history "sets us free and enables us to make up our own minds
dispassionately" about prior laws by destroying "inflated explanations." Id. at 225. See,
e.g., J. MILLER, supra note 13, at 189-201.
Oscar Handlin stated that the historians' duty is to record and preserve the truth as
best they can. 0. HANDLIN, TRUTH IN HISTORY 414-15 (1979).
351. A. FURTWANGLER, THE AuTHoRrry OF PUBLIUS 148 (1984).
352. We cannot and should not ignore motivations when engaging in historical anal-
ysis. Even assuming its feasibility, the motive/intent distinction leads to distorted his-
tory. Although he was criticizing the theories of history which only present factual se-
quences or analyze economic motivations, philosopher Alfred Whitehead made the
following general observation:
Such history confines itself to abstract mythology. The variety of motives is
excluded. You cannot write the history of religious development without esti-
mate of the motive-power of religious belief. The history of the Papacy is not a
mere sequence of behaviours. It illustrates a mode of causation, which is de-
rived from a mode of thought.
A.-. WHITEHEAD, MODES OF THOUGHT 24-25 (1938).
David Potter traced most historical disagreements back to competing theories of
human motivations and causation:
When such writers give their various interpretation, they are in part disagree-
ing about their immediate subject, but perhaps to a greater degree they are
merely applying to it their disagreement about the nature of human
motivations.
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Appendix A
This appendix lists cases that cite the following historical
works: a) Story's Commentaries; b) Kent's Commentaries; c)
Rawle's works; d) Fiske's The Critical Period in American His-
tory; e) Cooley's Constitutional Limitations; f) Curtis' work; g)
Elliot's Debates; h) Farrand's Records; i) Hamilton's Works; j)
Madison's Papers; k) Warren's The Supreme Court in United
States History; 1) Warren's The Making of the Constitution.
These citations were obtained through a LEXIS search and thus
extend from 1925 through 1984. The time required to find fur-
ther citations from works prior to 1925 would not be justified by
the benefit of such a search.
A. Story's Commentaries
Cases citing both The Federalist and Story's Commentaries: Myers v. United
States, 272 U.S. 52, 150 (1926); id. at 208 (McReynolds, J., dissenting); O'Donoghue v.
United States, 289 U.S. 516, 531 (1933); Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S.
398, 427 n.7, 429 (1934); Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 323, 324 n.3
(1934); Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 522 (1935); Humphrey's Ex'r v.
United States, 295 U.S. 602, 630 (1935); South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell
Bros., Inc., 303 U.S. 177, 186 (1938); United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 314 (1946); id.
at 322 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214, 228 n.15 (1952); id. at 232
n.* (Jackson, J., dissenting); District of Columbia v. John R. Thompson Co., 346 U.S.
100, 109 (1953); Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 209, 215 n.32 (1958) (Black, J.,
dissenting); Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 361 n.8, 362
n.12 (1959); United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 441 n.9, 443 n.16 (1965); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 488 n.3 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring); id. at 520 n.15
(Black, J., dissenting); United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 178 (1966); Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 154 n.21 (1968); id. at 173 n.3 (Harlan, J., dissenting); Powell v.
McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 537 n.69, 540 n.74 (1969); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112,
119 n.2 (1970); id. at 290 (Stewart, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Furman
v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 317 n.9 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring); id. at 470 (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting); Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, Tax Comm'r, 423 U.S. 276, 285 n.4, 293
n.12 (1976); National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 857 n.1, 863 n.5 (1976)
(Brennan, J., dissenting); Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 442 n.5
(1977); United States Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm'n, 434 U.S. 452, 462 n.11, 463
n.14 (1978); Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117, 142 (1978) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448
U.S. 555, 579, 579 n.15 (1980); Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 749 (1982); id. at 772
If I may use my definition still further, the practice of historians in treat-
ing certain developments as resulting from prior circumstances or events
means that, as Carr has said, the study of history is inescapably the study of
causes.
D. POTTER, HISTORY AND AMEIwcAN SocIETY 18-19 (D. Fehrenbacher ed. 1973).
There is a vast amount of legal scholarship discussing motivation and intent. One
should begin with Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional
Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205 (1970).
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n.12 (White, J., dissenting); Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 103 S. Ct.
2764, 2782, 2782 n.14 (1983).
Cases citing Story's Commentaries without The Federalist: Frick v. Pennsylvania,
268 U.S. 473, 499 (1925); Gitlow v. People of N.Y., 268 U.S. 652, 666 n.9 (1925); Patton v.
United States, 281 U.S. 276, 297 (1930); Surplus Trading Co. v. Cook, 281 U.S. 647, 655
(1930); Graham v. Good-Cell, 282 U.S. 409, 430 n.17 (1931); United States v. Sprague,
282 U.S. 716, 732 (1931); Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 714 (1931);
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 70 (1932); Board of Trustees v. United States, 289 U.S.
48, 58 (1933); Williams v. United States, 289 U.S. 553, 573 (1933); Dimick v. Schiedt, 293
U.S. 474, 485 (1935); Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago, R.I. & Pac. Ry.,
294 U.S. 648, 668 (1935); Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 587
n.17 (1935); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 64 n.11 (1936); Ashwander v. Tennessee
Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 331 (1936); Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 326
(1936) (Cardozo, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part); Ashton v. Cameron
County Water Improvement Dist. No. One., 298 U.S. 513, 537 (1936) (Cardozo, J., dis-
senting); United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123, 137 (1936); United States v. Curtiss-
Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 317 n.1 (1936); Cincinnati Soap Co. v. United States,
301 U.S. 308, 321 (1937); James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134, 147 (1937); Mul-
ford v. Smith, 307 U.S. 38, 48 n.19 (1939); United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 182 n.3
(1939); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941); Williams v. North Carolina, 325
U.S. 226, 228 n.3 (1945); United States v. Alcea Band of Tillamooks, 329 U.S. 40, 58
(1946) (Reed, J., dissenting); Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 116 (1947) (Black, J.,
dissenting-Appendix); Caldarola v. Eckert, 332 U.S. 155, 157 (1947); H.P. Hood & Sons,
Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 533 (1949); Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 558 (1952)
(Black, J., dissenting); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 207 n.5 (1954); United States ex rel.
Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 23 n.22 (1955); Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 203
(1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433, 439 (1958); Mc-
Gowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 441 (1961); Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 582
n.24 (1961); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 n.12 (1967); Chandler v. Judicial Coun-
cil, 398 U.S. 74, 96 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring); Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356,
371 n.7 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring); Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 415 (1972)
(Stewart, J. dissenting); Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 155 n.9 (1973); Monell v. De-
partment of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 687 n.46 (1978); Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 33
(1978); Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, 440 U.S. 668, 672 n.4 (1979); Hutchinson v.
Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 128 n.13 (1979); Gannett Co. v. Depasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 427
(1979) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Brown v. Glines, 444
U.S. 348, 363 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting); United States v. Ptasynski, 42 U.S. 74, 81
(1983); Marsh v. Chambers, 103 S. Ct. 3330, 3348 n.33 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting);
Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 S. Ct. 1355, 1361 (1984).
B. Kent's Commentaries
Cases citing The Federalist and Kent's Commentaries: Myers v. United States, 272
U.S. 52, 136-37, 149 (1926); O'Malley v. Woodrough, 307 U.S. 277, 285-86 (1939) (Butler,
J., dissenting); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 10 n.13 (1957); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S.
112, 164 n.15 (1970); id. at 290 (Stewart, J., dissenting); United States Steel Corp. v.
Multistate Tax Comm'n, 434 U.S. 452, 462 nn.11-12 (1978); United States v. Will, 449
U.S. 200, 218, 221 (1980).
Cases citing Kent's Commentaries without The Federalist: McGrain v. Daugherty,
273 U.S. 135, 161 n.14 (1927); Maul v. United States, 274 U.S. 501, 511 (1927); Black &
White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518,
530 (1928); Surplus Trading Co. v. Cook, 281 U.S. 647, 657 (1930); Graham v. Good-Cell,
282 U.S. 409, 430 n.17 (1931); Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 735 (1931)
(Butler, J., dissenting); Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 287 (1933); Detroit Trust
Co. v. The Thomas Barlum, 293 U.S. 21, 42 (1934); Hamilton v. Regents of the Univ. of
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Cal., 293 U.S. 245, 261 (1934); Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33, 48 (1941); C.J. Hendry
Co. v. Moore, 318 U.S. 133, 152 (1943); Fred Fisher Music Co. v. M. Witmark & Sons,
318 U.S. 643, 651-52 (1943); United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 261 n.5 (1946); Col-
grove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 553 (1946); Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14, 18
(1946); United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 33 n.16 (1947); Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334
U.S. 343, 361 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 340
U.S. 54, 58 n.6 (1950); United States v. Caltex, Inc., 344 U.S. 149, 154 n.6 (1952); Garner
v. Teamsters Local 776, 346 U.S. 485, 496 n.19 (1953); Armstrong v. Armstrong, 350 U.S.
568, 579 n.3 (1956) (Black, J., concurring); Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731, 735
n.4 (1961); Montana v. Kennedy, 366 U.S. 308, 312 (1961); Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S.
429, 453 n.16 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring); Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532, 554 n.20
(1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 335 n.11 (1977); Douglas v.
Seacoast Prods., Inc., 431 U.S. 265, 279 n.13 (1977); Monell v. Department of Social
Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 689 n.51 (1978); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979); Washing-
ton v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 678
n.23 (1979); Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 638 n.16 (1982) (Stevens, J., dissenting);
Idaho ex rel. Evans v. Oregon, 103 S. Ct. 2817, 2826 (1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
C. Rawle's Works
Cases citing The Federalist and Rawle's works: O'Donoghue v. United States, 289
U.S. 516, 531, 532 (1933); School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203,
240 n.8, 253 n.17 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring).
Cases citing Rawle's works without The Federalist: Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson,
283 U.S. 697, 734 n.2 (1931) (Butler, J., dissenting); McElroy v. United States ex rel.
Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281, 284 n.3 (1960).
D. Fiske's The Critical Period in American History
The Federalist and Fiske were cited in Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290
U.S. 398, 427 n.7 (1934). Cases citing Fiske's The Critical Period in American History
without The Federalist: Independent Warehouses, Inc. v. Scheele, 331 U.S. 70, 94 (1947)
(Jackson, J., dissenting); H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 533 (1949);
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 429 n.11 (1962).
E. Cooley's Constitutional Limitations
Cases citing The Federalist and Cooley's Constitutional Limitations: Myers v.
United States, 272 U.S. 52, 183-84, 218 (1926) (McReynolds, J., dissenting); Home Bldg.
& Loan Ass'n, 290 U.S. 398, 427 n.7 (1934); id. at 452-53 (Sutherland, J., dissenting);
United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 314 (1946); id. at 322 (Frankfurter, J., concurring);
School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 240 n.8, 259 n.24 (1963)
(Brennan, J., concurring); United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 443 n.16, 446 n.19
(1965); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 210-11 (1970) (Harlan, J., dissenting); id. at
266-67 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 383 n.5 (1972) (Bur-
ger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 470 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Cases citing Cooley's Constitutional Limitations without The Federalist: McGrain
v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 161 n.15 (1927); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 522 (1927);
Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U.S. 235, 242 (1928); Posados v. Warner, Barnes & Co.,
279 U.S. 340, 344 (1929); United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716, 732 (1931); Near v.
Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 734 n.2 (1931) (Butler, J., dissenting); Nathanson
v. United States, 290 U.S. 41, 46 (1931); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233,
249-50 (1936); Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 345 (1936) (Brandeis,
J., concurring); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 404 (1937) (Sutherland, J.,
dissenting); United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 182 n.3 (1939); Paramino Lumber Co.
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v. Marshall, 309 U.S. 370, 380 n.23 (1940); Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 140
n.7 (1942) (Murphy, J., dissenting); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 127 n.13
(1943) (Reed, J., dissenting); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 155 n.10 (1944); NLRB
v. A.J. Tower Co., 329 U.S. 324, 331-32 (1946); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 14
n.16 (1947); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 270 n.25 (1948); Armstrong v. Armstrong, 350
U.S. 568, 579 n.4 (1956) (Black, J., concurring); United States v. UAW-CIO, 352 U.S.
567, 590 n.4 (1957); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 249 n.21 (1958); Crooker v. Califor-
nia, 357 U.S. 433, 439 (1958); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 210 n.12 (1961) (Frank-
furter, J., dissenting); Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 580 (1961); Culombe v. Con-
necticut, 367 U.S. 568, 582 n.24 (1961); Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 392 (1962); New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 276 (1964); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 542
(1965); Curtis Publishing Co., v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 150 (1967); Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 381 (1974) (White, J., dissenting); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809,
829 (1975); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 374 n.29 (1976); Monell v. Department of Social
Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 679 n.39 (1978); Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 46 n.10 (1978) (Powell,
J., dissenting); Gannett Co. v. Depasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 382 n.9 (1979); Payton v. New
York, 445 U.S. 573, 598 n.45 (1980).
F. Curtis' Work
Cases citing The Federalist and Curtis' work: Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell,
290 U.S. 398, 427 n.7 (1934); id. at 457 n.2 (Sutherland, J., dissenting); Baldwin v. G.A.F.
Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 522 (1935); South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell
Bros., Inc., 303 U.S. 177, 186 (1938); Polar Ice Cream & Creamery Co. v. Andrews, 375
U.S. 361, 374 (1964).
Cases citing Curtis' work without The Federalist: The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S.
655, 683 (1929); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 96 n.42 (1970).
G. Elliot's Debates
Cases citing The Federalist and Elliot's Debates: Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blais-
dell, 290 U.S. 398, 427 nn.6-7 (1934); Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313,
323, 324 (1934); Richfield Oil Corp. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 329 U.S. 69, 76 n.3
(1946); National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 632 n.9, 635
(1949) (Vinson, C.J., dissenting); District of Columbia, v. John R. Thompson Co., 346
U.S. 100, 109, 110 (1953); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 9 n.12, 10 n.13 (1957); Draper v.
United States, 358 U.S. 307, 317, 320 (1959) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Romero v. Interna-
tional Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 361 n.8 (1959); id. at 394 n.5 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting in part and concurring in part); Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton,
361 U.S. 234, 268 nn.16 & 18 (1960) (Whittaker, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 303 n.38, 308 n.72 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting);
Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 15 n. 39 (1964); id. at 38 n.31 (Harlan, J., dissenting);
Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 31 (1965); United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169,
177, 178 (1966); O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 277, 277 n.2 (1969) (Harlan, J., dis-
senting); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 502 n.19, 540 n.74 (1969); Oregon v. Mitch-
ell, 400 U.S. 112, 120 n.2 (1970); id. at 210 (Harlan, J., dissenting); Furman v. Georgia,
408 U.S. 238, 259 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 466 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting);
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 661 n.9 (1974); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S.
166, 178 n.11 (1976); id. at 193 (Powell, J., concurring); National League of Cities v.
Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 857 n.1, 863 n.5 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Nevada v. Hall,
440 U.S. 410, 419 n.16 (1979); Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. Mississippi, 456
U.S. 742, 784 n.13, 792 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 772 n.12, 774 n.15 (1982) (White, J., dissenting); Equal
Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 249 n.8 (1983) (Stevens,
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J., concurring); id. at 268 n.3 (Powell, J., dissenting); Immigration & Naturalization Serv.
v. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. 2764, 2783 (1983); id. at 2800 n.17 (White, J., dissenting).
Cases citing Elliot's Debates without The Federalist: United States v. Belmont, 301
U.S. 324, 331 (1937); James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134, 142 (1937); Cham-
bers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 236 n.9 (1940); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124
(1941); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 122 n.4 (1943); Ashcraft v. Tennessee,
322 U.S. 143, 154 n.9 (1944); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 257 n.6 (1952); Lum-
bermen's Mut. Casualty Co. v. Elbert, 348 U.S. 48, 54 (1954) (Frankfurter, J., concur-
ring); United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 38 n.18 (1955) (Reed, J., dis-
senting); Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 448 (1956) (Douglas, J., dissenting);
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 488 n.22 (1957); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S.
420, 439 n.16 (1961); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 488 n.10 (1961); Culombe v. Con-
necticut, 367 U.S. 568, 581 n.23 (1961); England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Exam-
iners, 375 U.S. 411, 428 (1964) (Douglas, J., concurring); New York Times Co. v. Sulli-
van, 376 U.S. 254, 274 (1964); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 591 n.4 (1964) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting); City of Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808, 840 n.2 (1966) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 389 (1967); Warden, Md. Penitentiary v.
Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 316 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S.
254, 273 n.4 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 175 n.7
(1970) (Harlan, J., concurring); Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279, 290 (1971); Columbia
Broadcasting Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 157 (1973) (Douglas, J., con-
curring); Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 155 n.8 (1973); United States v. Matlock, 415
U.S. 164, 181 n.1 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S.
323, 340 (1974); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 170 n.17 (1976); Ingraham v. Wright, 430
U.S. 651, 666 n.35 (1977); Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 342 n.8 (1979)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Gannett Co. v. Depasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 426 (1979) (Black-
mun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 287
n.1 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting); Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 104
S. Ct. 2709, 2720 n.9 (1984).
H. Farrand's Records
Cases citing The Federalist and Farrand's Records: Myers v. United States, 272 U.S.
52, 110, 136-37 (1926); Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 427 nn.6 & 7
(1934); Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 522 (1935); South Carolina State
Highway Dep't v. Barnell Bros., Inc., 303 U.S. 177, 186 (1938); Cramer v. United States,
325 U.S. 1, 22 (1945); id. at 76 (Douglas, J., dissenting); Richfield Oil Corp. v. State Bd.
of Equalization, 329 U.S. 69, 76 nn.2 & 3 (1946); National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater
Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 591 (1949); id. at 621 n.16 (Rutledge, J., concurring); Reid v.
Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 10 n.13, 17 n.31 (1957); Romero v. International Terminal Operating
Co., 358 U.S. 354, 361 n.8 (1959); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 534,
556 n.2 (1959) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 261 n.10 (1962)
(Clark, J., concurring); id. at 303 n.38 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Glidden Co. v. Zda-
nok, 370 U.S. 530, 551 (1962); School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S.
203, 240 n.8, 255 n.19 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring); Polar Ice Cream & Creamery Co.
v. Andrews, 375 U.S. 361, 374 (1964); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 9 n.12, 15 n.39
(1964); Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 31 (1965); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 488 n.3 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring); id. at 513 n.6 (Black, J., dissenting);
United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 177, 178-79 (1966); Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116,
135 n.13 (1966); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 130 nn.19 & 20 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissent-
ing); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 44, 44 n.3 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring);
O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 277, 277 n.2 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Powell v.
McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 540 n.74 (1969); id. at 551 n.2 (Douglas, J., concurring); Ore-
gon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 289 n.1, 290 (1970) (Stewart, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 18 n.3, 21 n.6 (1972) (Douglas, J., dis-
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senting); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 178 n.11 (1974); id. at 193 (Powell,
J., concurring); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 232, 232
n.2 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 704-05, 705
n.15 (1974); Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256, 262 n.5, 263 n.6 (1974); Michelin Tire Corp. v.
Wages, Tax Comm'r, 423 U.S. 276, 283, 285 n.4 (1976); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 120
n.159, 129 n.166 (1976); Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 442 n.5, 447
n.11 (1977); United States Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm'n, 434 U.S. 452, 461 n.11
(1978); Department of Revenue v. Association of Wash. Stevedoring Cos., 435 U.S. 734,
754 n.19, 760 (1978); Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 448 n.12
(1979); United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 220 (1980); Railway Labor Executives Ass'n
v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457, 466, 472 n.13 (1982); Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 771 n.7,
772 n.12 (1982) (White, J., dissenting); Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe
Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 57, 60 n.11 (1982); Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v.
Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 267 n.2, 268 n.3 (1983) (Powell, J., dissenting); Immigration &
Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. 2764, 2782, 2782 n.14 (1983).
Cases citing Farrand's Records without The Federalist: In re Philip Grossman, 267
U.S. 87, 112 (1925); Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145, 155 n.3 (1932);
Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 122 n.3 (1943) (Reed, J. dissenting); Williams v.
North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 229 (1945); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408,
419 n.17 (1946); United States v. Congress of Indus. Orgs., 335 U.S. 106, 124 n.1 (1948)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring); H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 534
(1949); National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 591 (1949);
Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609, 615 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Kawakita v.
United States, 343 U.S. 717, 733 (1952); Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 170 (1964)
(Clark, J., dissenting); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 685 n.9 (1966)
(Harlan, J., dissenting); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 94 n.35 (1970); Colgrove v.
Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 153 n.8 (1973); Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477, 494 n.1 (1975)
(Rehnquist, J., concurring); Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656, 661 n.5 (1975);
Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 34 n.25 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Parklane
Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 341 n.6 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Orr v. Orr,
440 U.S. 268, 290 n.1 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55,
79 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring); United States v. Ptasynski, 462 U.S. 74, 80 n.10
(1983); Marsh v. Chambers, 103 S. Ct. 3330, 3333 n.6 (1983).
L Hamilton's Works
Cases citing The Federalist and Hamilton's Works: Myers v. United States, 272
U.S. 52, 136-39 (1926); United States v. Southeastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533,
539 n.9 (1944); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 682 n.26, 684 n.31
(1952) (Vinson, J., dissenting); School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S.
203, 237 n.6, 240 n.8 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1,
15 nn.38 & 39 (1964).
Cases citing Hamilton's Works without The Federalist: Perry v. United States, 294
U.S. 330, 352 n.2 (1935) (McReynolds, J., dissenting); New York ex rel Cohn v. Graves,
300 U.S. 308, 309 (1937); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 533-34 (1958) (Douglas, J.,
concurring).
J. Madison's Papers
Cases citing The Federalist and Madison's papers: Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301
U.S. 548, 606 (1937) (McReynolds, J., dissenting); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 8 n.8, 10
n.13 (1957). Madison's papers were cited without The Federalist in Baldrige v. Shapiro,
455 U.S. 345, 354 n.9 (1982).
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K. Warren's The Supreme Court in United States History
Cases citing The Federalist and The Supreme Court in United States History: My-
ers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 184, 218 n* (1926) (McReynolds, J., dissenting); Home
Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 427 n.7, 431 n.11 (1934); Cramer v. United
States, 325 U.S. 1, 26 n.38 (1945); id. at 75-76 (Douglas, J., dissenting); Duncan v.
Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 324 n.22 (1946); id. at 325 (Murphy, J., concurring); Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 215 n.43 (1962); id. at 303 n.38 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Employ-
ees of the Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Department of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411
U.S. 279, 292 n.7 (1973) (Marshall, J., concurring); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 660,
661 n.9 (1974).
Cases citing The Supreme Court in United States History wihtout The Federalist:
County of Spokane v. United States, 279 U.S. 80, 89 (1929); Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304
U.S. 64, 74 n.8 (1938); Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 76 n.6 (1947) (Black, J., dis-
senting); Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 219 n.3 (1959); Clay v. Sun Ins. Office Ltd., 363
U.S. 207, 223 n.19 (1960) (Black, J., dissenting); Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117, 150
(1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 466 n.1 (1962) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 415-16 (1963); Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U.S.
111, 117 n.10 (1965); Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620, 638 n.3 (1970) (Doug-
las, J., concurring); Douglas v. Seacoast Prods., Inc., 431 U.S. 265, 279 n.15 (1977).
L. Warren's The Making of the Constitution
Cases citing The Federalist and The Making of the Constitution: Home Bldg. &
Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 427 nn.6 & 7 (1934); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 10
n.13, 30 n.54 (1957); Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 361
n.8 (1959); id. at 394 n.5 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part); Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 451 n.12 (1964) (White, J., dissenting);
Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116, 135 n.13 (1966); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 530
n.58, 540 n.74 (1969); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705 n.15, 708 n.17 (1974);
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 120 n.159 (1976); id. at 274 n.21 (White, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part); Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 442
n.5, 447 n.11 (1977); Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742,
791, 794 n.32 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Cases citing The Making of the Constitution without The Federalist: H.P. Hood &
Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 533 (1949); Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 34
n.25 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting); United States v. Ptasynski, 462 U.S. 74, 81 (1983).
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